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THE CIVIL RIGHTS HYDRA
Neal Devins*
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA. By Hugh Davis Graham. New York: Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 578. $29.95.

The story of federal civil rights enforcement may be impossible to
chronicle. Antidiscrimination requirements bind all federal agencies 1
and each agency brings to this drama its own unique experiences. Indeed, during the Reagan years, significant civil rights enforcement
controversies emerged in such unlikely places as the National Endowment for the Humanities,2 the Federal Communications Commission, 3
the Department of the Treasury,4 and the Department of Transportation. 5 There were also controversies involving the usual suspects the Department of Justice, 6 the Equal Employment Opportunity Com• Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William & Mary. A.B.
1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt. - Ed. Thanks to Herman Belz, Larry
Evans, Phil Lyons, Jeremy Rabkin, and Charles Shanor for valuable commentary. All errors are
my own.
1. See infra notes 142-43.
2. See Hearing on Reauthorization of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities

Act of 1965: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (questioning NEA refusal to file an affirmative
action plan with the EEOC).
3. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 Before Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
(oversight hearings questioning propriety of FCC reexamination of race and gender preferences);
see also Devins, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TExAs L. REV. 125
(1990).
4. See Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 193-94, 213-14, 218-20, 236, 237 (1982) (testimony of R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secretary, Treasury; Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General; and William Bradford Reynolds, Asst. Attorney General, questioning propriety of IRS rescission of nondiscrimination rules
governing receipt of federal tax exemptions); see also Rabkin, Behind the Tax-Exempt School
Debate, PUB. INT., Summer 1982, at 21.
5. See The Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program of the Federal-Aid Highway Act:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transportation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Reauthorization of the Federal-Aid Highway Program:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); SENATE CoMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY
Acr OF 1986, s. REP. No. 369, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
6. Controversy and dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice is best reflected in the
Senate's failure to confirm William Bradford Reynolds, Reagan's Assistant Attorney General for
civil rights, as Associate Attorney General. See Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be

Associate Attorney General ofthe United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For overview critiques, see U.S. CoMMN. ON CIV. RIGHTS,
FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS 45-65 (1987) [hereinafter
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mission, 7 the Department of Labor, 8 the Small Business Administration,9 the Department of Education, 10 the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 11 and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 12
This complex web does not lend itself to generalization and, not surprisingly, scholars have been reluctant to undertake the arduous task
of a comprehensive treatment of this topic.
A recent and welcome attempt at a far-ranging examination of federal civil rights enforcement is Hugh Davis Graham's The Civil Rights
Era. 13 Graham examines the years 1960-1972 and makes his subject
the executive branch. The executive branch is chosen in order to examine the "full policy cycle." 14 As Graham aptly notes: "[W]hile
presidents and congresses come and go, the federal agencies abide, defining through administrative law and regulation the precise meaning
of broad statutory provisions that Congress could not conceivably tailor to the nuances of America's workaday life" (p. 7). Graham chose
the 1960-1972 time period for two reasons. First, in Graham's estimation, comprehensive federal attention to civil rights begins with the
1960 Kennedy election and by 1972 the "new order" of comprehensive
civil rights enforcement was set in place (p. 4). Second, during this
period, civil rights policy evolved from a focus on individualized fair
1987 CRC REPORT]; Reynolds, The Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge
for the Future, 42 V AND. L. REV. 993 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1986: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 354 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chair-

man, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a Reagan appointee criticizing Carter-era
guidelines as a "rigid and mechanical mathematical approach" concerning discrimination);
STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 99TH CoNG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE
INvEsTIGATION OF CtvlL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 0PPORTU·
NITY CoMMN. (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter REPORT] (criticizing EEOC pattern and practice
charge processing).

8. See Affirmative Action and Federal Contract Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., !st Sess.
(1985) (reviewing White House examination of Executive Order 11,246); see also McDowell,
Affirmative Inaction, POLY. REv., Spring 1989, at 32.
9. See supra note 5.
10. See HOUSE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FAILURE AND FRAUD IN CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, H.R. REP. No. 334, !OOth
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (criticizing Department of Education enforcement of civil rights laws); see
also N. AMAKER, CtvtL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 33-59 (1988).
11. See N. AMAKER, supra note 10, at 79-101.
12. See Presidential Nominations to the Civil Rights Commission: Hearings on the Nominations ofMorris B. Abram, John A. Bunze/, Robert A. Destro, and Linda Chavez Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter Nomination
Hearings]; see also Comment, The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449 (1987).
13. Hugh Davis Graham is Professor of History at the University of Maryland, Baltimore.
14. "Full policy cycle," in addition to examining "the formulation and enactment phases of
the policy cycle," considers "the obscure and complex phase of implementation." P. 5.
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treatment objectives to emphasis on group claims for proportionate
representation (p. 5).
Graham's objective is lofty and he accomplishes much. The Civil
Rights Era is a gripping, literate account oflandmark civil rights legislation governing employment, housing, and voting. The executive
branch focus is also useful both in demonstrating the fundamental role
played by the White House in the enactment of these legislative reforms and in providing insightful glimpses into the Kennedy, Johnson,
and Nixon administrations. Graham, moreover, provides revealing
looks at several executive initiatives, many of which are as influential
as civil rights legislation. 15 For these reasons, The Civil Rights Era is a
highly accessible and quite worthwhile addition to the literature.
Graham's undertaking is only a mixed success, however. Graham's suggestion that civil rights policy shifted from simple nondiscrimination to group rights between 1966 and 1968 (p. 456) is subject
to question. Although - as Graham convincingly demonstrates Congress rejected both numerical proofs of discrimination and quota
hiring in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 16 ample evidence exists
that civil rights activists both inside and outside the Executive were
interested in numerical equality from the start. 17 The great transformation of civil rights policy then is more a reflection of how the administration of law transcends the letter of the law. This important
point buttresses Graham's "full policy cycle" emphasis, but it is not
made in The Civil Rights Era. More significantly, Graham does not
meet the challenge he sets for himself through his use of "full policy
cycle" analysis, namely, the demonstration of the stranglehold possessed by the permanent civil rights establishment over the White
House and its appointees. Neither the relationship between interest
groups and enforcement agencies nor the relationship between oversight committees and enforcement agencies is given serious treatment.
Moreover, relative to the extensive treatment given the enactment of
civil rights legislation and the promulgation of executive orders,
agency enforcement decisions are given short shrift. In some respects,
this failing is inevitable. The story of implementation begins after the
enactment of legislation. The Civil Rights Era is fundamentally a book
about a period in which elected branch efforts focused on the enactment stage. Furthermore, Graham seems only marginally interested
in the politics of implementation during the 1960-1972 period.
15. Graham clearly deserves accolades for his exhaustive research of White House sources
available through the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon libraries. See pp. 477-79 (describing research methodology).
16. Pp. 125-52. Quota hiring mandates the employment of a predetermined percentage of
some group (women, racial minorities, etc.) in the workplace; numerical proofs of discrimination
pay attention to group imbalance in determining whether an employer has engaged in illegal
discrimination.
17. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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These omissions are truly unfortunate. The 1960-1972 period is a
benchmark for the administrative presidency. The twilight of the imperial presidency associated with the New Deal was the Johnson presidency, and the Nixon administration marked the imperial presidency's
demise. 18 From 1958 to 1974, Congress became more liberal and
more assertive. 19 This change was caused in large measure by the
weakening of conservative southern Democrats in Congress associated
with 1960s civil rights reform. 20 Congress' rising assertiveness, during
the Nixon years at least, also was reflected in increasing legislative
oversight of policy implementation. Recognizing that Congress has
ultimate power over program content and funding, agency heads
proved responsive to committee concerns. By the early 1970s, Richard Nixon launched the so-called "administrative presidency"21 in an
effort to restore White House control of the administrative state.
These dramatic sea changes in government are hardly noticeable in
The Civil Rights Era. Graham's work is too much about specific
events and too little about changing landscapes. In the end, it is an
excellent book that dares to be great but does not quite make it. Indeed, Graham's ambitions and his skillful presentation of an epic story
of civil rights reform make the book's inability to reach its intended
heights a bit surprising.
This review serves as a partial bridge between what Graham intends and what he delivers. Part I describes some of the book's ample
lessons. Attention is placed in Part I on Graham's too-short discussion of agency policymaking and administration. Part II supplements
this discussion by referring to pertinent 1960-1972 era policymaking
and administration not given serious treatment in the book. Part III
- consistent with Graham's inadequately proven thesis - argues that
it is extremely difficult for a president to centralize civil rights enforcement. This Part focuses on the Reagan White House's limited success
in changing the face of civil rights enforcement.
The Reagan experience, however, suggests a far more complicated
story than the one depicted by Graham. The presidency, despite the
difficulties of centralization, is neither enfeebled nor captured by civil
rights interest groups. An administration with a clear ideological vi18. Prior to the middle or late 1960s, according to Martin Shapiro, the norm was that
"[c]ourts should defer to Congress, Congress should defer to the President. So courts really were
to defer to the Executive." Shapiro, A.P.A.: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 451
(1986).
19. See Melnick, The Courts, Congress, and Programmatic Rights, in REMAKING AMERICAN
PoLmCS 188 (R. Harris & s. Milikis eds. 1989).
20. See id.
21. R. NATIIAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED: NIXON AND TIIE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESI·
DENCY (1975). With respect to the fundamental importance of administration, see P. ARNOLD,
MAKING TIIE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENT (1986). It is Arnold's position that "the president
ought to be concerned with administration, not because he is a manager but because administration is part of the system through which his choices become policy." Id. at 363.
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sion, a commitment to that vision, and political savvy can effectively
centralize its civil rights enforcement efforts. The Reagan administration, contrary to popular wisdom, lacked both a clear ideological vision with respect to civil rights and a commitment to pursue that
vision. Instead, the administration viewed civil rights as a matter to be
worked out through the tugs and pulls of politics. Consequently, civil
rights centralization took a back seat to tax reform, federalism, and
deregulation objectives.
Reagan administration civil rights enforcement efforts also were
marred by political ineptitude. Unwilling to work within the political
culture they inherited, Reagan political appointees sacrificed gains in
enforcement by engaging in pitched and counterproductive battles
with Congress and the civil rights community. A more adept administration, contrary to Graham's assertions, would have made far more
progress in advancing its agenda.
Conservatives who bemoan the death of the presidency are in error. The presidency - albeit constrained - remains potent. By summarizing and extending Graham's work, this review provides a
glimpse into the exercise and management of presidential power.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA DESCRIBED

Graham describes his work as a story about a "social movement[]" which "broke the back of the system of racial segregation" (p.
3). As such, Graham considers all federal action in the civil rights
arena fair game for investigation. From this huge smorgasbord, Graham has chosen employment, voting, fair housing, and the equal rights
amendment. By book's end, however, it is apparent that only one issue truly matters to Graham. The dominant target of Graham's study
is employment - both the enactment and enforcement of statutory
antidiscrimination prohibitions and executive initiatives to increase
minority employment among government contractors.
Graham accomplishes much through this choice of emphasis.
First, employment best reveals the "full policy cycle" that Graham
seeks to penetrate. Unlike court-driven school desegregation and voting, employment policy is fundamentally the domain of the administrative state. Second, the shift from individual protection to group
rights was played out more explicitly in the employment context than
in any other area.
The inclusion of other select topics, then, enriches and provides a
broader frame for understanding the establishment and evolution of
employment policy. To the extent that Graham intends to tell a comprehensive story of 1960-1972 reforms, moreover, these otherwise ancillary matters are essential. In any event, Graham's discussion of
voting, housing, and equal rights - even if tangential - provides important insights to these topics. The housing chapter, for example,
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clarifies the common misperception that the 1968 Civil Rights Act was
enacted to stave off racial unrest in the wake of the April 1968 King
assassination. In March 1968, after President Johnson had effectively
given up on open housing legislation due to prior legislative disinterest, the Senate "astonishing[ly]" pursued the matter with vigor - including invoking cloture on a southern filibuster (p. 270). While the
King murder accelerated House action, Congress' action appears not
to have been driven by expediency.
In contrast, expediency had very much to do with President
Nixon's "stewardship" of the equal rights amendment. Graham's insightful discussion reveals that the Nixon White House's interest in
gender issues was spurred by Urban Affairs Council head Daniel Patrick Moynihan's recommendation that Nixon "take advantage of a
surging force that was ripe for creative leadership" (p. 400). The
White House responded by creating a Women's Task Force whose report (favoring E.R.A.-type solutions to gender inequality (p. 405)) languished until a coalition of prominent Republican women pressured
the White House (p. 406). The upshot of this was the White House
"fastening on any positive action it could safely take to rally the
aroused women's support" (p. 408), for example, supporting the
E.R.A.22
Expediency also plays a large role in Graham's account of the
Nixon administration's handling of voting rights. As part of his strategy to woo southern Democrats to the Republican party, Nixon unsuccessfully sought repeal of the 1965 Voting Rights Act requirement
that southern states "preclear" any electoral changes that would adversely affect minority interests.23 . Nixon's efforts in voting rights also
reveal the close nexus between bureaucratic structure and civil rights
policy. In 1969, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department
was reorganized from sections corresponding to geographic regions to
sections organized by function. With respect to voting, the reorganization " 'had the unanticipated consequence of producing an experienced team of attorneys dedicated to furthering [preclearance
objectives].' " 24
22. Interestingly, the only Nixon official to oppose the E.R.A. vigorously was then Assistant
Attorney General William Rehnquist who viewed the overall effect of the amendment as" 'nothing less than the sharp reduction in importance of the family unit, with the eventual elimination
of that unit by no means improbable.'" P. 408 (quoting Garment to Ehrlichman, Memorandum
for the President, May 25, 1970). Indeed, in congressional testimony recognizing that " 'President Nixon and this Administration support the goal of establishing equal rights for women,' "
Rehnquist nonetheless argued against the propriety of the amendment. P. 417 (quoting H.R.J.
Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist)).
23. Pp. 356-60. The administration also sought to win favor in the South by highlighting the
hypocrisy of dual north-south standards. Noting that a higher percentage of minorities voted in
the South than in either New York or California, the administration sought a nationwide - as
opposed to a South-only - ban on literacy tests. Pp. 354-55.
24. P. 362 (quoting s. LAWSON, PURSUIT OF POWER 162-63 (1985) (emphasis added)).
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Voting is important for another reason. The preclearance provision in the 1965 Act, according to Graham, was the first "hint[] of a
radical shift from procedural to substantive criteria in civil rights law,
from intent to effect, from equal opportunity as a right to equality as a
fact and as a result" (p. 174). The story of this shift lies at the heart of
The Civil Rights Era. It is a story told by reference to executive fair
employment initiatives, antidiscrimination laws passed by Congress,
and agency initiatives.
A.

The Kennedy Years

The Kennedy era, despite Graham's meticulous one hundred-page
account, reveals surprisingly little about the shift from fair treatment
to just result objectives. "Insecure in his relations with Congress" (p.
65), Kennedy ducked an activist role in civil rights issues until his
hand was forced by racial violence in the South (p. 66). Indeed, Kennedy balked at including an antidiscrimination-in-employment provision in proposed federal civil rights legislation.25 The White House,
instead, endorsed a combination of voluntary efforts by private business (Plans for Progress), in which the administration served as cheerleader,26 and an interagency committee headed by Vice President
Johnson designed to ensure nondiscrimination in the awarding of federal grants. Without real authority over federal grants or loans, affected agencies subordinated antidiscrimination objectives to their own
interests in efficient procurement and "back-scratching mutuality"
with existing contractors (p. 44). As Graham notes, "the President's
unifying command and power" (p. 44) is prerequisite to centralization
of otherwise diffuse agency interests. Without strong presidential
leadership, as the Kennedy experience reveals, department and agency
heads will view themselves as kings over their discrete domains.
The Kennedy years are revealing for another reason. The origins
of affirmative action can be traced to a Kennedy executive order requiring government contractors to take "affirmative action to ensure
that applicants [and] ... employees are treated ... without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin."27 Graham is quick to
point out the irony that this "affirmative action" demand called for
nothing more than the fair treatment objective of eliminating discriminatory employment practices (pp. 34, 41). Indeed, when asked his
views of demands by black leaders for "job quotas by race," Kennedy
responded, "I don't think we can undo the past .... [While] the past
25. Pp. 95-99. Kennedy, however, did issue an executive order in November 1962 mandating nondiscrimination in federally assisted housing. See R. MORGA!N, THE PRESIDENT AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 60-78 (1970).
26. Pp. 50-54. The administration ultimately withdrew its support for this voluntary approach in favor of more traditional compliance and enforcement. Id. at 54-59.
27. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1972 (1961).
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is going to be with us for a good many years ... [w]e have to do the
best we can now . . . . I don't think quotas are a good idea. " 28
There were foreshadowings of measures of numerical equality during the Kennedy years, however. The Labor Department, in responding to discrimination in apprenticeship training, proposed that
apprenticeship lists "be disregarded to the extent necessary to provide
opportunities [for qualified minorities] ... for a significant number of
positions."29 Rescinded under intense union pressure, the labor action
seems a precursor to the race conscious apprenticeship training program approved fifteen years later by the Supreme Court in United
Steelworkers v. Weber. 30 Graham also notes divisions among civil
rights leaders on the quota question (pp. 116-21), but he dismisses this
evidence, concluding that "the debate [during the Kennedy years] over
racial quotas elicited a virtually unanimous public condemnation of
the notion of racial preference" (p. 120).
B.

The Johnson and Nixon Administrations

A different saga is told concerning the Johnson administration
which, according to Graham, transformed the goal of civil rights policy toward the achievement of numerical equality. This transformation involved both White House and agency initiated programs. That
this transformation occurred during the Johnson years is hardly surprising. Unlike Kennedy, Johnson cared passionately about racial
equality and made it a centerpiece of his administration. 31
President Johnson's views are best revealed in a June 1965 speech
at Howard University. At this speech, Johnson exclaimed that "freedom is not enough" and that "the next and more profound stage of the
battle for civil rights ... [is] not just equality as a right and a theory
but equality as a fact and equality as a result." 32 For Johnson, a remedy promising fair outcomes was the only way to "wipe away the scars
of centuries." 33 This speech, in the eyes of Johnson official Joseph
Califano, demonstrates Johnson's "unabashed[] [support] for special
help and affirmative action." 34 Graham, while more circumspect, rec28. PUB. PAPERS: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963, at 633-34 (1964) (Aug. 20, 1963 Press
Conference).
29. P. 115 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Labor press release, June 6, 1963).
30. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding voluntary one minority for one nonminority promotion
plan promulgated in response to pervasive union discrimination).
31. See J. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 230 (1981) (describing Johnson's commitment
to civil rights as "passionate").
32. 2 PUB. PAPERS: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 636 (1966).
33. Id. For Johnson, one mechanism of ensuring fair outcomes was the race-specific designation of certain political appointments. See, e.g., p. 226 (discussing Johnson's desire to replace
EEOC Commissioner Aileen Hernandez from a "list of Mexicans" prepared by John Connally).
34. J. CALIFANO, supra note 31, at 231.
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ognizes the speech to be a foreshadowing of a "crucial transition" (p.
174).
Ironically, the true precursors to the shift to numerical equality are
two events soundly rooted in fair individual treatment objectives.
First, in a nonpolicy-driven reorganization of federal civil rights enforcement (p. 184), President Johnson entrusted with the Secretary of
Labor the responsibility to ensure that government contractors "as an
initial part of their bid" comply with the preexisting demand that "affirmative action" be taken to root out discrimination on the basis of
"race, creed, color, or national origin." 35 Better known as Executive
Order 11,246, this reorganization ultimately set in motion the demand
for adequate minority representation among federal contractors. 36
Second, a White House team comprised of Robert Kennedy,
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Burke Marshall worked with Republican
Senator Everett Dirksen to assure passage of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and, with it, to create the EEOC. Graham convincingly shows that Title VII was designed both to avoid the imposition
of numerical hiring demands on employers and to limit the sweep of
EEOC power (pp. 125-52). Title VII provisions require proof of discriminatory intent, 37 prohibit the granting of "preferential treatment"
to attain racial balance, 38 and protect an employer's right to use professionally developed ability testing unless it was "designed, intended,
or used to discriminate." 39 The EEOC was denied the "cease and desist" powers of investigation, litigation, and adjudication typically associated with independent agencies. Instead, the EEOC's role was
limited to complaint-processing associated with private enforcement.40
According to Graham, this limited role was pushed by Dirksen to protect employers from "harassment" by "a new mission agency like the
EEOC" (p. 146). Despite these structural and statutory limitations,
35. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). Executive Order 11,246 was typical
of the Johnson administration practice of using reorganizations to accomplish efficiency rather
than policy objectives. See E. REDFORD & M. BLISSETI, ORGANIZING THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH 107-41 (1981). For discussion of policymaking by way of reorganization see infra notes
180-82 and accompanying text.
36. Ironically, liberals at the time criticized Executive Order 11,246 for dissolving a White
House Coordinating Council chaired by Hubert Humphrey in favor of Labor Department enforcement. P. 188.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). In explaining this
provision, Hubert Humphrey noted that "the respondent must have intended to discriminate,"
and "inadvertent or accidental discrimination will not violate the title." 110 CoNG. REc. 12724
(1964).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988). For further discussion, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
40. The Act also authorized the Department of Justice to file "pattern or practice" claims of
systematic discrimination, § 707, and recognized broad authority in existing state fair employment agencies, §§ 706(c),(d), 709(b),(d).
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the EEOC emerges as the lead actor in pursuing numerical measures
of equality.
Surprisingly, while EEOC enforcement efforts and Executive Order 11,246 demands are rooted in the activist Johnson presidency, the
Nixon administration proved more than complicit in advancing these
Johnson initiatives. Graham's tale of the transformation of civil rights
policy from nondiscrimination to group rights, then, is a story of two
administrations. Indeed, as The Civil Rights Era amply demonstrates,
Nixon administration efforts often proved as important as Johnson initiatives in cementing both EEOC efforts and the 11,246 program.
1.

TheEEOC

Graham's portrait of the EEOC, albeit incomplete,41 is revealing
on several fronts. It shows that an agency's nascent stages play an
extraordinary role in shaping agency policy. Authorizing legislation is
often a tabula rasa to be fleshed out by the agency through its implementing regulations and interpretations. In the words of Alfred
Blumrosen, a key staffer during the EEOC's early years: "A new administrative agency has vast opportunities to demonstrate creative intelligence in its initial decisions. These decisions, made by a handful of
men and women who comprise the initial staff, reverberate through
time and space in a tidal wave of consequences for both procedure and
substance."42 With respect to the EEOC, Graham demonstrates that
the early years at the agency set in stone critical agency interpretations
of both its own authority and substantive Title VII law. These interpretations, moreover, are emblematic of early EEOC efforts to transform Title VII from what was - according to Jack Greenberg - a
"weak, cumbersome, [and] probably unworkable" set of provisions43
into the most powerful civil rights statute. Finally, although this point
is subject to question,44 Graham concludes that White House indifference allowed the EEOC to be captured by the "increasingly militant
civil rights constituency."45
Graham's account also shows that the life of the law is its imple41. See infra note 44.
42. A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 51 (1971).
43. P. 189 (quoting Harwood, Battling Job Bias, Wall St. J., May 28, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 1).
44. Indeed, in many instances, the EEOC, not the NAACP, played the lead role in advanc·
ing broad-ranging interpretations of Title VII. For example, EEOC lawyers initiated the substitution of disparate impact standard for intent-based proofs. P. 250. In fact, one of the most
surprising revelations in Graham's account is early NAACP opposition to minority identification
in institutional records. Although the EEOC intended to monitor equal employment efforts ag·
gressively through such identification, NAACP officials cautioned that "the minute you put race
on a civil service form, the minute you put a picture on an application form, you have opened the
door to discrimination." P. 199.
45. P. 157. This phenomenon-whether it be described as "capture" or merely extraordina·
rily amicable relationships between the EEOC and its constituents - is revealed in EEOC efforts
to assist civil rights organizations in their litigation efforts. P. 244.
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mentation. Senator Dirksen's efforts to limit the EEOC's role statutorily to complaint-processing were subverted by artful interpretations
of Title VII. For example, statutory language disfavoring general recordk.eeping requirements was sidestepped by agency claims that state
data is too inexact to support systematic national monitoring (pp. 19397). This interpretation was later characterized by Alfred Blumrosen
as a creative reading of the statute "contrary to the plain meaning." 46
A more striking example is the EEOC's filing of amicus briefs to express its substantive views on Title VII law despite Congress' explicit
prohibition of EEOC-initiated litigation.47 This enabled the EEOC to
argue in court that Title VII outlawed employer practices " 'which
prove to have a demonstrable racial effect.' " 48 The EEOC recognized
that its "constructive proof of discrimination" reading was at odds
with explicit statutory language and hence unlikely to receive judicial
approval.4 9 To the agency's and the civil rights community's delight
and surprise, in Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court validated
this broad reading. so
Implementation is a two-edged sword, however. Whereas EEOC
efforts to eradicate raee discrimination reveal the power of aggressive
enforcement, early EEOC lack of interest in gender discrimination
made a mockery of this statutory prohibition. As Representative
Martha Griffiths observed in 1966, the EEOC was "'wringing its
hands about the sex provision' " so as not to " 'interfere with the
46. P. 195 (quoting A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 42, at 72). Before the EEOC put this broad
reading into effect, a meeting was arranged to see whether Senator Dirksen would be troubled by
this breach of the legislative bargain. Dirksen said. no, and the reporting system was put into
place. A. BLUMROSEN, supra note 42, at 73.
.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (1988) (1972 Amendments granted EEOC authority to
intervene in civil actions brought against nongovemment respondents under Title VII; prior to
these amendments the EEOC was authorized only to refer matters to the Attorney General with
recommendations for the Attorney General either to intervene or to institute civil actions).
48. P. 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson, EEOC vs. Discrimination, Inc., THE CR!sIS,
Jan. 1968, at 17). The argument's architect was Commission attorney Sonia Pressman. Recognizing both that her argument was a stretch and that some legitimate personnel decisions would
come under fire, Pressman advocated that the "active pursuit of an equal opportunity policy"
necessitated that blacks be "recruited, hired, transferred, and promoted in line with their ability
and numbers." P. 247 (quoting memo from Pressman to Duncan, May 31, 1966, at 8). This
revealing discussion of internal agency decisionmaking on this critical question is one of the
book's highlights. See also H. BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 45-46 (1991) (discussing similar argument advanced by EEOC staff
member Alfred Blumrosen).
49. According to Graham, the Commission's administrative history concluded that
" '[e]ventually this will call for reconsideration of the amendment [requiring proof of intent] by
Congress' ... 'or the reconsideration of [this broad] interpretation by the Commission.' " P. 250
(quoting EEOC administrative history).
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Interestingly, the EEOC thought the facts of Griggs favored industry and hence recommended that the NAACP wait for a less vulnerable case. P. 385. This ex
parte dialogue between the EEOC and the NAACP is one more example of the identity of interest between the EEOC and the civil rights community.
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EEOC's 'main' business of eliminating racial discrimination.' "St Graham's remarkable account of EEOC ambivalence about women-only
("Jane Crow") classified ads suggests an agency desire to disregard initially at least - the sex discrimination prohibition altogether. 52
Although the agency eventually outlawed single-sex ads in 1968 (p.
231), Graham's account of Jane Crow is a counterpoint to racial enforcement that ironically makes the same point about the right-defining nature of the implementation power.
In addition to the power of both early interpretation and implementation, a third key lesson is discernible from The Civil Rights Era:
the judiciary is a key player in the modem administrative state. Since
court action and not administrative enforcement governs Title VII, the
judicial branch plays a leading role in this area. Consequently, by deferring to early EEOC interpretations of Title VII, the Court enacted
EEO C's recreation of Title VII - a feat EEOC could not accomplish
on its own.
The courts' complicity is revealing in other ways. When Title VII
was amended in 1972, EEOC chair William Brown and former agency
official Alfred Blumrosen both preferred agency authority to initiate
litigation over the granting of "cease and desist" authority to the
agency. Brown characterized the agency as a civil rights advocate in
need of an activist forum - specifically, the judiciary.53 Blumrosen,
emphasizing the dangers of regulatory agencies becoming "captive" to
the regulated industry, argued that a weaker institutional framework
(one in which the agency did not have cease and desist authority) enables civil rights activists to use federal courts " 'which are favorable
to their demands'" (p. 431). Ironically, as Graham describes it, the
Nixon administration favored judicial enforcement for exactly opposite reasons, namely, "the Republicans' vintage judicial strategy of
maximizing the role of adversary proceedings in court so as to minimize the judgmental discretion of New Dealish regulatory agencies."54
51. P. 225 (quoting 112 CoNG. REc. 13693, 13694 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Griffiths)). For
further discussion of the tension between race and sex discrimination claims, see pp. 211-18.
52. The EEOC's November 1965 answer to the problem of sex segregated ads was to require
that advertisers indicate in the "Jobs oflnterest-Female" column whether men were eligible and
vice-versa. P. 217. The EEOC reasoned that" '[c]ulture and mores, personal inclinations, and
physical limitations will operate to make many job categories primarily of interest to men or
women.'" P. 217 (quoting EEOC Chairman Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.). In April 1966, the
EEOC shockingly modified this weak policy to make it less burdensome on publishers. Pp. 21821.
By the end of the Johnson administration, however, "the EEOC seemed settled on a path that
would tightly link race and sex in EEO enforcement.'' P. 232.
53. Pp. 429-30. Brown flip-flopped on this matter and eventually came to endorse the more
traditional "cease and desist" model. P. 433.
54. Pp. 426-27. Curiously, with the sole exception of Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist,
the Nixon administration never raised doubts about the propriety of strengthening Title VII in
1972. For Rehnquist's observations, see pp. 424-25. Belz attributes Nixon's "uncritical" accept·
ance of judicial enforcement "notwithstanding the drastic revision of the law [through court
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The 1972 amendments, among other things, endorsed the judicial
enforcement model. They fortified the judiciary's leadership role in
the Title VII arena. As such, Congress denied itself some of the traditional tools of oversight (for example, confirmation, appropriations,
legislative veto) in shaping the development of Title VII. Congressional dissatisfaction with substantive judicial rulemaking, instead,
could only be expressed through statutory amendment. 55 Graham,
although incorrectly presuming an activist judiciary predisposed to
furthering the interests of civil rights groups, 56 correctly characterizes
the EEOC model as a significant break from traditional regulatory
structures (pp. 469-70).
Graham's portrayal of the EEOC reinforces themes well known to
students of the modem administrative state: the identity of interests
between interest groups and agencies, the transient nature of original
legislative intent in the face of conflicting agency priorities, the sweep
of agency power in its early statutory constructions, policymaking by
way of resource prioritization, and the power of the judiciary to "codify" agency constructions. Graham's depiction also suggests that the
law as put into effect by an administrative agency may not be a law
that would receive prior congressional approval. Indeed, the Dirksen
compromise so central to Title VII's enactment stands in striking contrast to the Griggs-era EEOC. Agency subversion of legislative purpose is only half of the story told by The Civil Rights Era,· the other is
de facto presidential legislation by way of executive order.
2. Executive Order 11,246
The true embodiment of the shift from nondiscrimination to group
rights is Executive Order 11,246.57 Although numerical disparities
played a central role in EEOC enforcement, these disparities were
deemed a proxy for purposeful discrimination. In contrast, the numerical targets of Executive Order 11,246 are a requirement for contractors who do business with the federal government. Specifically,
the order demands an "acceptable" affirmative action program that
requires adequate "utilization of minorities and women, at all levels
and in all segments of [the] work force where deficiencies exist." 58
opinion] that was then taking place" to Nixon's preoccupation with "opposing the grant of cease
and desist authority." H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 73.
55. During the period of Graham's study, this changed dynamic proved irrelevant, for
agency and oversight committee desires were furthered by court interpretations. In recent years,
however, this judicial empowerment has proved the focal point of Title VII enforcement
controversies.
56. P. 470. Judicial activism in this area frequently came at the behest of the EEOC. While
the EEOC and civil rights groups shared the commonality of interests, there is no reason to think
that the courts were principally beholden to the civil rights community.
57. See supra note 35.
58. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1990). Executive Order 11,246 is implemented through regulations
known as Revised Order No. 4, which lists eight factors to determine whether there is minority
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The story of Executive Order 11,246 begins in the final months of
the Johnson administration. Troubled by racially discriminatory labor
unions that effectively cut off the supply of minority workers to government contractors, Department of Labor officials held up contracts
in Philadelphia and other select industrial cities until contractors submitted pledges to hire minority workers (p. 289). The General Accounting Office, Congress' budgetary watchdog, objected to this
maneuvering, however. Claiming that the failure to make such
pledges does not invalidate low bids,59 the GAO argued against " 'the
creation of a new sub-empire in the DOL without a shadow of authorization.' " 60 In response, the Labor Department rescinded the socalled Philadelphia Plan. Indeed, Johnson administration officials advised the Nixon transition team that the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCC) was too ineffective to operate independently and recommended that it be transferred from Labor and folded
into the EEOC (p. 296).
With the advent of the Nixon administration, the prospects for the
revitalization of the Philadelphia Plan seemed nonexistent. But revitalize the Plan is precisely what the Nixon administration - including
the President himself- did. The "why" behind this surprising Nixon
initiative is brilliantly told by Graham.
Graham begins by asking the obvious: "Why, then, did such a
man [who thought affirmative action 'simply would never do· any
good' and] who would appeal to southern and suburban whites on the
busing issue . . . begin his new administration by reviving the liberal
Democrats' explosively controversial Philadelphia Plan?" (p. 322).
Two factors seem at work here. First, Nixon Labor Secretary George
Shultz, after Everett Dirksen's criticisms of the OFCC placed him in a
defensive posture, decided to respond affirmatively by strengthening
the OFCC rather than transferring it to the EEOC (pp. 324-25).
Shultz's solution was to revitalize the Philadelphia Plan. Second,
President Nixon recognized that Shultz's suggestion created a "political dilemma" for the Democrats, namely, the division of two tradiunderutilization, including: (1) the minority population of the labor area surrounding the facil·
ity, (2) minority unemployment in the surrounding area, (3) availability of minorities with req·
uisite skills, and (4) potential for training minorities in requisite skills. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11
(1990). Employers who fail to comply with the order run the risk of losing vital government
contracts. This threat, of course, is extremely effective. As one contract compliance officer ex·
plained: "All that is needed is to take the employer to the cliff and say, 'Look over, baby.' "
Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity Procedures, Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1969).
59. For an insightful summary of this issue, see Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study
in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 726-32 (1972).
60. P. 293 (quoting Melvin E. Miller to J. Edward Welch memo, Dec. 11, 1967). The GAO
- interested in establishing its final authority to review the legality of federal expenditures argued that bidding requirements must be specific and definite. At this time, OFCC - fearing
Title VIl's prohibition of preferential treatment - perceived it could not frame its affirmative
action demands in terms specific enough to satisfy the GAO. See p. 296.
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tional Democrat constituencies - labor unions and civil rights groups
(p. 325). Graham claims Nixon's blatant opportunism here is emblematic of Nixon's approach towards social policy issues: "Lacking
any internally consistent model of civil rights theory, the Administration was free to pursue contradictory policies for short-term tactical
gains" (p. 302). While this characterization is disputable, 61 Graham
reveals a quite plausible groundwork for this daring initiative.
The Civil Rights Era provides revealing looks at the saga of Executive Order 11,246, the EEOC, voting rights, and other civil rights initiatives. In so doing, it provides insightful glimpses into both White
House management of executive policymaking and congressional-executive relations. Graham's examination of a twelve-year period also
permits examination of the role of the president's civil rights vision (or
lack thereof) in shaping national policy. Kennedy's tentativeness explains the lack of progress in his administration; Johnson's assertiveness points to the enactment of significant legislation in 1964, 1965,
and 1968 as well as aggressive administrative initiatives in the Department of Labor and the EEOC; Nixon's expediency points to compromise proposals on voting rights legislation and Title VII amendments,
as well as apparently contradictory positions on busing and Executive
Order 11,246. Graham, fu).ally, succeeds in offering a historical narrative which suggests a model of the modem administrative state - legislation principally designed by Congress and the White House,
interpretation and implementation by agencies, and court review of
agency action. 62
Nonetheless, by limiting his focus almost entirely to the enactment
of critical pieces of legislation or the establishment of White House
policy, Graham pays a heavy price. The White House's ability to
oversee agency implementation and, correlatively, agency relations
with interest groups and oversight committees, are hardly explored in
The Civil Rights Era. Consequently, despite Graham's assertion that a
principal focus of the book is the "full policy cycle" with attendant
lessons about the White House's ability to centralize civil rights enforcement, the book falls short on its promise to examine the full policy cycle.
The balance of this review helps flesh out Graham's central thesis
about bureaucratic structures and White House control. Part II, by
highlighting various federal programs that are an outgrowth of the
1960-1972 era, but are not discussed in The qvil Rights Era, reveals
the enormous sweep of federal civil rights enforcement, and with it,
the attendant difficulty of centralization. Part III further considers the
61. See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
62. See also Blumrosen, The Crossroads for Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 46, 47-48 (1973) (proposing a
similar model for administrative implementation of equal employment opportunity policy).
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prospects of White House centralization by examining Reagan administration efforts in this area.

II.

1960-1972: THE STORY NOT TOLD

Graham's account of the civil rights era suggests that the shift
from individual to group concerns emerged during the latter stages of
the Johnson presidency and was solidified during the early Nixon
years. A strong argument can be made, however, that this transformation predates the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that it had fully taken
place prior to the promulgation of the first set of EEOC guidelines in
1966. In other words, the line separating equality of treatment from
equality of results was blurred from the start. 63
From the early days of the Kennedy administration, civil rights
groups advocated race preferences. 64 Indeed, while President Kennedy argued against "hard and fast quotas," he also advised employers
to "look over employment rolls, look over areas where we are hiring
people and at least make sure we are giving everyone a fair chance. " 65
The seeds of race preference, then, were planted before the 1964 Act.
With the establishment of the EEOC, civil rights advocates both inside
and outside of government argued for use of numerical proofs to show
discrimination. In August 1965, one month after the Commission formally came into existence, a White House Conference on employment
discrimination set the tone for EEOC policy. 66 Participants included
civil rights groups, state fair employment commissions, employers,
and EEOC officials. As Herman Belz's review of the Conference transcript suggests, the conclusion reached - at least by EEOC officials was that "discrimination should be defined as patterns of social and
economic disadvantage caused by employment practices and social in63. Consequently, the Reagan administration's call to return to mid-1960s "soft" affirmative
action techniques of recruitment and training is a bit of a misnomer. See Abram, Affirmative
Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1312 (1986). Indeed, reliance on
"hard" affirmative action techniques such as goals, quotas, and timetables is explainable in part
by the fact that no good alternatives to such "hard" devices were ever put into effect.
64. In 1961, a Chicago Urban League official told a congressional committee that "[w]hat we
need to be is positively color conscious." Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity, Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., !st Sess. 190
(1961) (statement of Edwin C. Berry, Executive Director, Chicago Urban League). In 1962, the
Congress of Racial Equality advocated the employment of a representative number of blacks and
that black candidates be preferred over equally qualified whites. Equal Employment Opportunity:
Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 12JJ, and S. 1937 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and
Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., !st Sess. 204-05, 221 •
25 (1963); see also A. MEIER & E. RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE·
MENT 1942-1968, at 191-92, 232-35 (1973). See generally H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 7-41.
65. The President's News Conference of Aug. 20, 1963, reprinted in Pun. PAPERS: JOHN F.
KENNEDY, 1963, at 633-34. Graham's excerpt from this press conference deletes Kennedy's
suggestion that employers measure whether they are giving "everyone a fair chance" by
"look[ing] over employment rolls." See p. 106.
66. For a comprehensive- albeit biased - review of this Conference, see Where Civil Rights
Law is Going Wrong, NATION'S Bus., Nov. 1965, at 60.

May 1991)

The Civil Rights Hydra

1739

stitutions in general" and consequently employers should "conduct racial surveys, generate and publicize profiles of under-representation
problems, and hire minorities." 67 In its report on the Conference, the
Commission noted that with respect to preferential treatment "the
question was not whether we are meeting the letter of the law, as pertains to Title VII, but whether we are meeting the spirit of the law." 68
The ultimate embodiment of this sensibility was the EEOC's August 1966 guidelines on employee selection procedures. Although the
1964 Act excludes from coverage "any professionally developed ability
test ... not designed, intended or used to discriminate," 69 the EEOC
guidelines, in preferring the "spirit" to the letter of the law, urged
employers to recruit minorities and demanded that job screening and
interviewing be undertaken by individuals fully committed to equal
employment opportunity.70 The guidelines, moreover, required statistical validation for any test that rejected blacks at a higher rate than
whites. 71 The key to this aggressive agency posture was a dislike of
testing. Perceiving that cultural factors may affect performance on
many employment-related tests, the Commission argued that job performance and actual job requirements, not test scores, should be the
focus of hiring decisions. 72 Indeed, in 1970, an agency official vowed
to fight "[t]he cult of credentialism ... in whatever form it occurs." 73
The Civil Rights Era both gives short shrift to early EEOC initiatives and deemphasizes the significance of the early endorsement of
group rights by civil rights groups. As a result, Graham goes too far
in suggesting that, over time, the EEOC was captured by its clientele
interests. 74 The truth, instead, is that the EEOC was an agency with a
mind of its own.75 Graham also errs in suggesting that forces of nature inexplicably coalesced in the latter stages of the Johnson presidency and, suddenly, civil rights enforcement was transformed from
its liberal individualistic base to a group rights approach. While their
67. H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 28-29.
68. See Where Civil Rights Law is Going Wrong, supra note 66, at 70.
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
70. See Lyons, An Agency With a Mind ofIts Own: The EEOC's Guidelines on Employment
Testing, NEW PERSP. Fall 1985, at 20, 22; see also H. BELZ, supra note 48 at 116-18.
71. See Lyons, supra note 70, at 22.
72. See id. at 21-22.
73. See id. at 22 (quoting EEOC Chief Psychologist William Enneis).
74. In addition to the White House Conference and employee testing, EEOC recordkeeping
requirements support this claim.
75. This phrase derives from the title of Phil Lyons' article on EEOC testing. See Lyons,
supra note 70. In saying that the EEOC has a "mind of its own," I do not mean to suggest that
the EEOC operated in a vacuum. For example, key EEOC staff came from the civil rights community. This commonality helps explain the lead role that the EEOC played in advancing the
agenda of civil rights interest groups. However, the EEOC was not involuntarily "captured" by
these advocacy groups. This distinction is not merely semantic. A "captured" agency does not
determine its policy agenda; an agency that sees eye-to-eye with interest groups may well control
its policy agenda.
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potency increased over time, the use of numerical proofs seemed evi·
dent at the 1965 White House Conference. Ironically, the EEOC's
ability to disregard the delicate political compromise of 1964 lends
force to Graham's assertions of agency power. Consequently, these
criticisms suggest that Graham's arguments are even stronger than his
own presentation reveals.
Graham's history is also subject to attack for its selectivity. School
desegregation, the tax exempt status of private schools, and Nixon ad·
ministration efforts to provide special assistance to minority entrepre·
neurs are hardly mentioned in this volume. This is unfortunate.
Aside from being three of the most significant issues of the 1960·1972
period, 76 these topics bear directly on several of The Civil Rights Era's
central concerns: the rise of numerical measures of equality, executive
policymaking without legislative authorization, and the rising signifi·
cance of the dialogue between the judiciary and the elected branches.
Race and Education. The face of school desegregation was trans·
formed from 1960 to 1972. In 1960, Brown v. Board of Education's77
impact was principally symbolic. Indeed, in the decade following
Brown, less actual desegregation of southern schools occurred than in
1965 alone. 78 The implementation of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),79 coupled with the issuance and en·
forcement of guidelines for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
marked a significant shift in federal power over state education sys·
terns. 80 Rather than playing a minimalist role in helping schools bet·
ter educate their students, the federal government became a major
player in pushing schools to provide equal educational opportunity to
black children.
Surprisingly, Title VI, which prevents discriminatory institutions
from receiving federal dollars, was originally a mere bargaining chip in
76. Graham, of course, should not be expected to provide a detailed discussion of every civil
rights issue to emerge from 1960-1972. But he sets out as his objective the examination of bureaucratic structures and their impact on White House centralization. Cf. pp. 5, 7-8. He can,
therefore, be criticized for failing to examine secondary topics that highlight the principal points
he makes about Title VII and Executive Order 11,246. Race and education, as well as minority
business enterprise, are such topics. In view of Graham's "full policy cycle" approach, see supra
note 14 and accompanying text, as the balance of this section makes clear, these topics are at
least as important as housing, the ERA, and Kennedy-era developments.
77. 347 U.S. 483, (1954).
78. For the 1965-1966 school year, the percentage of black children in biracial schools in the
11 southern states rose from 2% to 6%. See BAILEY & E. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF
EDUCATION ADMINISTERS A LAW 153 (1968); see also Devins & Stedman, New Federalism in
Education: The Meaning of Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1243, 1246-51 (1984).
79. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386
(1988)).
80. With these enactments, the primary purpose of federal financial assistance for education
was no longer to help schools do better what they were already doing; rather, it was to remedy
their failure to provide equal educational opportunity to black children. See Hartle & Holland,
The Changing Context of Federal Education Aid, 15 EDUC. & URB. SocY. 408, 418-21 (1983).

s.
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the package of civil rights legislation submitted to Congress. 81 However, with Title Vi's demand that federal grant recipients not discriminate, Congress became willing to pump billions of dollars of aid for the
compensatory education of educationally deprived children. (Indeed,
this conditioning of federal aid upon the nondiscriminatory status of
the aid recipient prompted strong resistance to ESEA by southern
members of Congress who were concerned that the money would be
used to force desegregation.) These billions of dollars were sufficient
incentive for many school systems to comply with the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) nondiscrimination standards.
The story of early enforcement of Title VI by the OCR parallels
EEOC efforts to strengthen Title VII: agency interpretation in tandem
with court action mandating change. As OCR read Title Vi's legislative history, its requirements were consonant with current court rulings. 82 As a result, it interpreted Title Vi's desegregation
requirements as being both flexible and potentially expansive. Regulations issued by OCR in December 1964 stated that districts would be
considered in compliance with Title VI if they were subject to a court
order or if they submitted a desegregation plan subsequently approved
by the Commissioner of Education. 83 As judicial standards developed
calling for the immediate elimination of dual school systems, and as
the passage of ESEA in 1965 made Title VI enforcement in southern
school districts of particular concern to HEW officials, "a device for
gradual transition" was converted "into an engine of revolution." 84
The initial Title VI guidelines, issued in l965, required the desegregation of all grades by 1967. 85 In 1966, OCR issued revised guidelines
setting performance standards for desegregation in affected districts;
these guidelines also mandated faculty integration. 86 The revised
guidelines set more rigorous standards for freedom of choice plans,
reflecting increasing concern that these plans were intended primarily
to maintain dual school systems, not dismantle them. 87
The parallel between the OCR and the EEOC ends here. By the
third year of Title VI's enforcement, the resistance of state and local
81. See G. 0RFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS
AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 35, 39 (1969).
82. See id. at 43, 93.
83. 21 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 568 (1965). See infra note 85.
84. G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 45.
85. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 83, at 569. They specified that, at a minimum,
affected districts would have to desegregate four grades (five in some instances) for the 1965-1966
academic year. Districts could demonstrate their compliance by filing an assurance of compliance (not acceptable for districts with continuing dual system practices), coming under a court
order, or filing an acceptable desegregation plan. See id.
86. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 146.
87. See id.: see also SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92D
CoNG., 2D SESS., TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 196-97 (Comm. Print 1972).
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officials, as well as congressional restiveness over OCR's heightened
demands for desegregation, was strong enough to freeze the guidelines.
No changes were made for the 1967-1968 school year.ss At that time,
OCR requirements exceeded the requirements of federal court rulings
on school desegi-egation. s9
In 1969, with the Nixon administration in office, both the executive and legislative branches increasingly opposed the federal courts
and the OCR on school desegregation questions.9° Increasing emphasis on numerical measures of equality by both the OCR (to measure
discrimination) and the courts (to remedy discrimination), as well as
mounting concern over the extension of desegregation to districts
outside the South and heightened opposition to busing, provoked a
political reaction ultimately resulting in the taming of federal school
desegregation enforcement efforts. Congress, with the President's
blessing, enacted legislation curbing the OCR's enforcement of Title
VI, particularly with regard to mandatory reassignments. 91
This legislation reveals the obvious; that is, in a true battle between
elected government and bureaucratic administrators played out on a
statutory field, elected government will prevail. 92 By emphasizing the
primacy of bureaucratic structures, The Civil Rights Era does not fully
recognize that Congress (through amending legislation or funding restrictions) and the Executive (through appointments) hold trump
cards in contests with renegade agencies. 93 The manner in which this
88. See G. ORFIELD, supra note 81, at 258.
89. The OCR, for example, rejected freedom of choice plans prior to the Supreme Court's
Green decision. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra
note 87, at 197.
90. The Nixon administration, for example, sought to limit OCR enforcement both by
threatening not to withhold federal funds to ensure Title VI compliance and by instructing the
OCR - as well as the Department of Justice - that "they are to work with individual school
districts to hold busing to the minimum required by law." Naughton, Nixon Disavows H.E. W.
Proposal on School Busing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at A15, col. 3.
91. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1960s, the efforts of the federal government had dramati·
cally eroded southern school segregation. For example, between 1963 and 1968, the percentage
of black children in all-black schools in the South dropped from 98% to 25%. G. ORFIELD,
PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION JN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, at 5 (1983).
92. Interestingly, when OCR enforcement waned, civil rights plaintiffs went to court claiming OCR enforcement inconsistent with Title VI demands. This lawsuit, Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), was the first step in the judiciary's "capture" of the OCR. As
described by Jeremy Rabkin: "Launched in 1970, the case was still generating new briefs and
new judicial orders at the end of the 1980s, having expanded by then to encompass every facet of
the enforcement responsibilities of the defendant agency." J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS
147 (1989). For a more extensive discussion of this legislation's effect on the OCR, see generally
id. at 147-81. For an analysis of the related issue of whether the executive can sign onto a
consent decree which limits the policy discretion of successor administrations, see Rabkin &
Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decrees: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of
Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203 (1987).
93. The all-important dialogue which takes place between agencies and oversight committees
is strikingly absent from The Civil Rights Era.

May 1991]

The Civil Rights Hydra

1743

trump is (or is not) exercised is an important matter not addressed by
Graham.
The OCR experience is revealing in quite another way. Despite its
overt reliance on numerical proofs, the EEOC was not subject to the
same limitations as the OCR during this period, for Title VII - unlike
Title VI - was enforced through the courts by private parties. In
other words, since the EEOC did not directly enforce its interpretations of Title VII, the structural relationship between the courts, the
elected branches, and the agency was different here than with the
OCR. Where the OCR - like most federal offices - is especially
vulnerable to presidential appointments and congressional funding,
the judicial enforcement model of the EEOC provides an important
layer of insulation between Title VII and elected government. 94 The
Civil Rights Era recognizes this critical distinction (pp. 469-70); but,
by failing to compare the EEOC to other enforcement agencies, Graham's work is inadequate to the task of explaining the relationship
between bureaucratic structure and agency performance.
Federal equal educational opportunity enforcement also can be
contrasted to Title VII enforcement with respect to the related question of tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools. Segregated private schools, sometimes aided by state subsidies,
significantly impeded the achievement of nondiscrimination objectives
in education during the 1960-1972 period (and in the present day).9 5
From 1966 to 1972, enrollment in segregated private schools in districts subject to desegregation orders rose from 25,000 to 535,000.96
Yet before 1970, federal enforcement efforts were generally limited to
the Title VI prohibition of direct financial assistance to discriminatory
private schools. 97
The rise of segregated private schools contributed to the racial
stratification of public education by removing white children from
public school systems. Making matters worse, the IRS indirectly supported this undermining of public school desegregation through tax
breaks to segregated schools. 98 Consequently, in 1967, the U.S. Civil
94. Another difference is that EEOC enforcement is, for the most part, a factor worked into
the initial hiring decision. The EEOC influence then affects a limited number of people in an
undetectable way. In contrast, the busing issue is extraordinarily visible and raises concerns that
affect everyone, namely, the safety and schooling of children.
95. See Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS 274 (N. Devins ed. 1989).
96. See Note, Segregation Academics and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441 (1973).
97. One exception to this was a 1967 IRS rule that tax exemptions be denied to schools
whose operations violate the laws of the United States. I.R.S. News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) ~ 6734. This nondiscrimination policy was of
limited value, however. Its application extended only to private schools that had contracted with
the Army to teach the children of Army personnel.
98. For competing views on the impact of such tax breaks on public school desegregation,
compare Chemerinsky, supra note 95 with Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation
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Rights Commission urged the Johnson IRS to deny tax breaks to any
private school practicing racial discrimination. 99 The Johnson administration, however, concluded that the IRS was without legal authority
to deny tax exemptions, reasoning that the discriminatory admissions
practices of private schools violated no law.100
The Johnson administration's decision here is puzzling. Although
the Internal Revenue Code does not specify nondiscrimination as a
condition of federal tax exempt status, its tax exemption provision
arguably mandates nondiscrimination through its use of the word
"charitable"; Title VI's nondiscrimination mandate arguably extends
to both direct and indirect support; and the Constitution arguably prohibits indirect governmental support of private discrimination. 101 Indeed, since the IRS demand would be one of simple
nondiscrimination, the Johnson IRS position seems somewhat
surprising.
The likely explanation for the surface variations in practices of the
EEOC and the IRS is that the two agencies serve different constituencies. The EEOC, as Graham demonstrates, sees itself as a civil rights
advocate. As such, it is predisposed to expand its statutory mandate
to serve this higher objective. The IRS, in contrast, does not serve this
constituency and hence is unlikely to place civil rights concerns ahead
of its interest in effective administration. In fact, by denying reform
efforts initiated by political factions, the IRS insulates itself from interest group politics and hence improves its ability to reign over the Tax
Code. The potentially conflicting objectives of the IRS and the EEOC
support Graham's assertion that White House centralization of civil
rights enforcement is a difficult task. 102 Civil rights enforcement cuts
across all federal agencies. Not surprisingly, each agency will value
civil rights objectives in light of its other priorities. Consequently, centralization in civil rights enforcement demands that the White House
play an extremely aggressive role - making civil rights a priority at
the expense of other policy objectives. The Civil Rights Era barely
hints at this critical attribute of civil rights enforcement.
The private school tax exemption issue also lends important support to Graham's assertion that from 1960-1972 the judiciary emerged
of Private Education by the Internal Revenue Service, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS,
supra note 95, at 133.
99. U.S. CoMMN. ON C1v. RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 99100 (1967).
100. See Rabkin supra note 98, at 139.
101. For a summary of statutory and constitutional arguments on this matter, see Galvin &
Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis o/Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353,
1368 (1983).
102. Furthermore, like the EEOC, the OCR was aligned with the civil rights community and
hence took an aggressive approach in interpreting its Title VI authority. Unlike Title VII enforcement, however, public opposition to expansive school desegregation orders ultimately led to
the curtailment of OCR power. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
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as a key player in the administrative state. Unlike judicial enforcement of Title VII, which assisted the EEOC in its efforts to liberalize
Title VII, the courts played the lead role in reversing the IRS' extension of tax breaks to discriminatory schools. 103 In 1969, rather than
seek legislative reversal of the IRS policy through statutory amendment, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights filed suit, raising statutory and constitutional objections to the IRS policy. This strategy
paid off. After a preliminary injunction was issued against the Service,
the government - reportedly after high level discussions in the White
House 104 - reversed its position and announced that it could "no
longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to private schools
which practice racial discrimination .... "1os
This concession, too, seems surprising. After all, the preservation
of the status quo at the IRS was implicit in Nixon's Southern Strategy
opposing school desegregation remedies. Yet, after denouncing the
new IRS policy, southerners began to see the "logic" of the Nixon IRS
action. Following a meeting with IRS Commissioner Randolph
Thrower, Mississippi Republican Party Chairman Clark Reed perceived the IRS announcement as merely symbolic; he announced that
"[i]f Thrower sticks to his word and is sincere in taking action only to
offset more extreme court action, no private school ... I know of ...
will be without tax exempt status for a single day." 106
This episode reveals, in starker form than anything discussed by
Graham, the potential reach of judicial authority in the shaping of
civil rights administration. That the courts should, as Skelly Wright
put it, fill in the voids where "the elected branches of government
should have acted and failed" 107 portends a type of judicial oversight
of agency decisionmaking that may well exceed traditional legislative
oversight. The private school tax exemption affair is proof positive of
this new judicial role.
·
Although Graham pays limited attention to Nixon's Southern
Strategy, neither the OCR nor the IRS emerges as an actor in The
Civil Rights Era. Their experiences, however, are revealing both as
separate tales of civil rights enforcement and as part of a larger mosaic
of federal civil rights enforcement. Indeed, with respect to Graham's
103. See generally McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools. 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1984) (chronicling court's
disregard of standing, adverseness, and mootness in federal tax exemption litigation).
104. Indeed, the White House went out of its way to signal President Nixon's personal involvement in the decision. See D. WHITMAN, RONALD REAGAN AND TAX-EXEMPTIONS FOR
RACIST SCHOOLS (1984) (Kennedy School of Government Study).
105. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, reprinted in 1970 Stan. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1f 6790.
106. Reed, Both Sides in South Mistrust Nixon Action on School Integration, N.Y. Times,
July 16, 1970, at A22, col. 1.
107. Rabkin, supra note 4, at 34. Wright limits this activism to the "area of equal rights for
disadvantaged minorities." Id.
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larger concerns of assessing both White House centralization efforts
and the advent of the judiciary as a key player in the administrative
state, race and education issues seem at least as important to The Civil
Rights Era as housing, the equal rights amendment, and quite possibly
voting rights.
Minority Business Enterprise. The Civil Rights Era is strangely
mute on various Nixon initiatives to encourage minority business enterprise through explicit race preferences. 108 These programs demonstrate that Executive Order 11,246 was not a fluke. The Nixon
administration, rather than seek political advantage through endorsement of a single affirmative action plan, was solidly in the corner of
race preferences. This commitment to race preferences reinforces
Graham's assertion that group rights concerns had by 197;2 trumped
equality of opportunity concerns - an assertion, incidentally, that
grounds Graham's explanation as to why 1960-1972 is an appropriate
period to study. Indeed, since numerical proofs of discrimination utilized in Title VII and voting can be characterized as measurements of
purposeful discrimination, 109 and since Executive Order 11,246- according to Graham's account - seems a political anomaly, some discussion of minority business enterprises seems necessary to make
airtight Graham's group rights claim.
In 1953, Congress created the Small Business Administration
(SBA), an agency which by contracting - under its section 8(a) authority - with government agencies to set aside work for SBA-designated small businesses110 ensured the award of government contracts
to small businesses. At that time, the focus of SBA section 8(a) efforts
was race-neutral economic development. With Congress' enactment
in 1967 of legislation designed to assist economically disadvantaged
small business, 111 the SBA set-aside program began to change focus.
In June 1969, the SBA had created an Office of Business Development
to "deal with the complex problems involved in effectively using the
authority of section 8(a)." 112 In November 1970, SBA regulations
108. Graham's discussion is limited to a brief two-page discussion of the Office of Minority
Business Enterprises. Pp. 314-16.
109. Proponents of numerical proofs of discrimination claim that the inadequacy of the intent standard as an accurate gauge of discrimination necessitates the use of numerical measures.
See, e.g., Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 637a (1982). My discussion of the Small Business Administration draws
heavily from P. Lyons, The Small Business Administration's Section 8(a) Set-Aside Program
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author). See also Levinson, A Study of Preferential
Treatment: The Evolution ofMinority Business Enterprise Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 61 (1980).
111. Small Bus. Act Amends. of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-104, 81 Stat. 268 (1967).
112. Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Set-Asides and B(a) Subcontracts: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Government Procurement of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970) (statement of Edward N. Odell, Acting Deputy Director, Office of
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specified program eligibility to firms owned by "socially or economically disadvantaged persons," that is, a category of owners of firms
that "includes, but is not restricted to, Black Americans, American
Indians, Spanish Americans, Oriental Americans, Eskimos and
Aleuts." 113 Although these criteria technically did not prohibit
nonminority participation in the 8(a) program, a 1978 SBA report indicated that ninety-six percent of 8(a) participants ·were minorityowned firms. 114
This minority specification was rooted in a rather creative reading
of the 1967 statute. The SBA assumed that, by referring to "low
income" individuals in the statute, Congress' concern was not simply economic disadvantage but also social disadvantage. In addition, the SBA assumed, as SBA head Thomas Kleppe put it, that
" 'minority' is a shorthand for the phrase 'socially or economically
disadvantaged.' " 115
This feat of statutory construction, which certainly matches EEOC
interpretations of Title VII in audacity, was encouraged by the White
House. Between March 1969 and October 1971, President Nixon issued three executive orders to "help establish and promote minority
business." The creation of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise1 16 within the Department of Commerce and the call for increased representation of "Minority Business Enterprises" within
federal departments and agencies 117 were the byproduct of these executive orders. Moreover, in 1971, a President's Advisory Council Report advocated that minorities be provided "a substantially increased
stake in the American economy," 118 for "[t]he unique historical experience of ... disadvantaged minorities ... cannot be ignored in shaping a national effort to produce substantial new entrepreneurial
activity." 119 The Nixon administration then, as Phil Lyons puts it,
was "determined to act on its conviction that some groups in our sociBusiness Development, Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C., accompanied by Clifford J. Hawley, District Director, Small Business Administration, Albuquerque, New Mexico).
113. 13 C.F.R. § 124-8.l(c) (1971).
114. § 8(A) REVIEW BOARD, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, REPORT AND RE.COMMENDATIONS ON THE SECTION 8(A) PROGRAM FOR A. VERNON WEAVER, ADMINISTRATOR,
SBA 23 (1978); see also Levinson, supra note 110, at 66.
115. Government Minority Small Business Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minority Small Business Enterprise of the House Select Comm. on Small Business. 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1971) [hereinafter Small Business Hearings] (testimony of Thomas S. Kleppe, Administrator, Small Business Administration, accompanied by John A. Knebel, General Counsel, and
Arthur McZier, Assistant Administrator for Minority Enterprise).
116. Exec. Order No. 11,458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969); see also Exec. Order No. 11,625, 3
C.F.R. 616 (1971) (authorizing OMBE to provide financial assistance to organizations "so that
they may render technical and management assistance to minority business enterprises").
117. Exec. Order No. 11,518, 3 C.F.R. 907 (1970).
118. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, MINORITY
ENTERPRISE AND EXPANDED OWNERSHIP: BLUEPRINT FOR THE 70s 5 (1971).
119. Id. at 10.
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ety, due to no fault of their own, had not enjoyed economic progress in
comparison to other groups."120
In 1971, efforts to curtail the SBA program were launched in Congress and the courts. Senate and House oversight committees both
heard that the minority designation was without statutory authorization.121 Yet, perhaps because committee members were sympathetic
to the SBA section 8(a) program, 122 little real pressure was placed on
the SBA and, in 1978, Congress codified the section 8(a) program. 123
In court, a constitutional reverse discrimination challenge ultimately
failed because of plaintiffs' lack of standing.124
The SBA section 8(a) program and minority business enterprise
executive orders are revealing on several fronts. First, the Nixon administration's commitment to these programs demonstrates the prevalence of the group rights approach in the early 1970s. Although the
Nixon administration's full throttle commitment to increasing both
minority enterprise and minority employment suggests - contrary to
Graham - that Nixon's support of civil rights was more real than
superficial, 125 Graham's thesis regarding the dominance of group
rights concerns ultimately would benefit from a more forceful presentation of the solidification of affirmative action largesse in the Nixon
era. Second, the explicit designation of groups other than blacks as
program beneficiaries is a development of extraordinary significance.
Politically, broadening the base of the beneficiaries proved critical to
the near deferential approach of oversight committees to the section
8(a) program. Yet over time, this legitimation of a racial spoils system
led to vigorous battles between in and out groups over their fair share
of this government pie. 126 This ancillary phenomenon exemplifies the
shift to group rights, for these battles made mockeries of both the
120. P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 27.
121. See Small Business Hearings, supra note 115, at 35 (Rep. Robinson's criticism of the
minority designation); SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FEDERAL SPENDING PRACTICES AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMITIEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT BASED ON HEAR·
INGS AND INQUIRIES CoNDUCTED ON THE SBA INVOLVING ABUSES IN THE 8(A) PROGRAM 4
(Comm. Print 1978) (" 'Social or economic disadvantage' is a phrase initiated by SBA's Office of
General Counsel to step around the constitutional questions raised by the 8(a) program.")
122. Cf P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 30-33 (discussing committee members' advocacy of
minority interests).
123. Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757-73 (1978). For further discussion, see Levinson, supra
note 110, at 84-94.
124. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 709-10 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). At the district court level, however, plaintiffs prevailed on the
merits. 334 F. Supp. 194 (1971).
125. See also H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 35 (Nixon pressed employment equality in Eisenhower administration), at 38-39 (Philadelphia Plan support rooted in belief in minority economic
development), at 94-95 (SBA 8(a) program).
126. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 42,832 (1979) (granting presumptive disadvantaged status to
Asian-Pacific Americans) with 45 Fed. Reg. 25,563 (1980) (denying presumptive status to
Hasidic Jews).
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ethos of individualism (which views as morally offensive the treatment
of individuals as members of a group) and of remedial principles
(which would draw sharp lines between blacks and other minority
groups based on differing degrees of discrimination suffered at the
hands of government). Third, an agency's ability to use its authorizing
statute as a creative license is well-illustrated in SBA interpretations of
its section 8(a) authority. This story reinforces Graham's central lesson about the EEOC. Fourth, although not as dramatic or significant
as Executive Order 11,246, presidential executive order power is also
illustrated here. Fifth and finally, the role of the courts and legislative
oversight committees is again revealed here. That the challenges
sought to limit group rights decisionmaking and that the challenges
failed also point to the solidification of the group rights approach.

* * *

Minority business enterprise, race and education, and employment
testing strengthen Graham's central contentions about the ascendancy
of group rights and the ability of agencies to transform legislative priorities. These issues also are instructive in stating the complex interchange that takes place between the agency, interest groups, the
White House, and Congress. The Civil Rights Era, with its "full policy
cycle" emphasis, would have been well served by the inclusion of these
topics.
III.

REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WHITE
HOUSE CENTRALIZATION

The explicit and implicit conclusions of The Civil Rights Era suggest an enfeebled presidency. Graham gives several reasons for this.
First, the "full policy cycle" reveals that career bureaucrats, not political appointees, ultimately hold the key in the running of government
agencies (p. 7). Second, triangular power relationships that form
among an agency, its legislative oversight committee, and its constituent interests effectively foreclose active White House involvement in
the running of government (p. 470). Third, to the extent that agencies
disregard constituent interests, the judiciary will likely impose these
constituent desires on agencies (p. 470). Fourth, agency power is at its
apex immediately after the enactment of legislation. During this period, agency statutory interpretations - validated by court opinions
- shape the meaning of legislation into a form acceptable to the
agency. 127 Correlatively, although Graham does not make this point,
agencies are circumscribed in their ability to "recreate" their legislative mandate once court opinions cement agency constructions. In
other words, a White House that inherits a preexisting enforcement
scheme has rather limited options.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53.
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Graham's proof of these propositions is wanting. Furthermore,
some of these propositions are suspect. While it is indisputable that
careerist attorneys in both the Justice Department and the EEOC
helped shape agency policy, there is no reason to suspect that these
policy directions were not in accord with the desires of political appointees. In fact, the Nixon and Johnson administrations' support of
sweeping civil rights initiatives suggests just the opposite. Moreover,
even if careerists unilaterally shaped policy in the Nixon and Johnson
years, that does not mean that a president ideologically opposed to this
careerist vision could not retool the agency to suit his priorities. For
example, President Reagan sought to undertake such a retooling in
several government agencies.
Graham's failure to discuss relationships between oversight committees and either agencies or interest groups is also problematic because it makes his assertion about "iron triangles" pure speculation.
Moreover, the mere potential that such triangular relationships may
form does not mean that that potential will be realized. During the
Reagan years, for example, relationships between agencies, on the one
hand, and oversight committees 128 and interest groups 129, on the other
hand, were often testy. Finally, although the courts often impose constituent views on agencies, courts - at least during the Reagan years
- sometimes prefer the White House's view.130
These criticisms of Graham's proof do not mean that Graham's
ultimate conclusions about the difficulties of White House centralization are in error. Early agency interpretations are extraordinarily influential, careerists do remain after a president's term is complete,
courts do order agencies to comply with constituent interests claims,
and oversight committees do exert tremendous power over agencies.
In addition to the vast array of federal programs and agencies in need
of coordination, these phenomena stand as roadblocks to White House
centralization efforts. These roadblocks, however, do not foreclose
White House influences; instead, they deny presidential supremacy
and force the administration to supplement traditional policymakingthrough-rulemaking with such back door policymaking devices as appointments, agency reorganization and policy prioritization. 131
Although such policymaking devices are necessarily transitory (for
subsequent administrations can exercise the powers of appointment,
128. See infra notes 160, 162, 174-79, 187 and accompanying text.
129. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
130. Compare Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but the
Shouting, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 524 (1987) (Reagan Department of Justice attack on affirmative
action soundly defeated by Supreme Court) with Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68
Texas L. Rev. 353, 378 (1989) ("[V]iewed as a mosaic, the cases leave unanswered many questions about the scope of permissible aflirmative action.").
131. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
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policy prioritization, and reorganization to displace their predecessor's
objectives), they play quite a large role in civil rights enforcement.
The reaches and limits of White House civil rights efforts can be
seen in Reagan's efforts to centralize civil rights policy. Reagan took
office at the height of federal efforts to impose numerical measures of
equality. During the Carter years, existing programs, such as Executive Order 11,246 and section 8(a), were strengthened132 and numerous race- and gender-conscious initiatives were launched throughout
federal departments and agencies. 133 Reagan made opposition to these
Carter initiatives a centerpiece of his campaign, arguing that "equal
opportunity should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and
decisions which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to
exclude some individuals in favor of others, thereby rendering such
regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory."13 4
The manner in which Reagan sought to effect change is also significant. In addition to the appointment of like-minded individuals, 135
Reagan intended to reestablish the White House as the locus of federal
power. Almost immediately after assuming office, Reagan formed a
Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 136 The byproduct of this task force
was the creation of an entity within the White House, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), to screen all agency
rulemaking. 137 The Reagan White House then appeared ready, will132. See P. Lyons, supra note 110, at 46-52 (discussing 8(a) program under Carter); Clark,
Affirmative Action May Fall Victim to Reagan's Regulatory Reform Drive, NATL. J., July 11,
1981, at 1248, 1250.
133. See generally Finn, ''Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, CoMMENTARY, Apr. 1982, at
17, 18-20. Carter initiatives included efforts to demand adequate minority student representation
in tax-exempt private schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978); the granting of preferences to minority broadcasters, Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68
F.C.C. 2d 979 (1978); the establishment of a minority business enterprise set aside for Department of Transportation highway programs, Department of Transportation Order No. 4000.7A,
43 Fed. Reg. 20, 883 (1978); and the EEOC's 1978 Uniform Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295
(1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 38,312 (1978).
134. 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in 36 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 50-B, 62-B (1980).
Compare 1980 Democratic Platform, reprinted in 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 91-B, 105-B ("[A)n effective affirmative action program is an essential component of our commitment to expanding
civil rights protections."). Reagan, moreover, did not change his rhetoric once in office.
135. The Reagan administration made commitment to an antiregulatory agenda, rather than
substantive expertise in the relevant program, the critical prerequisite to presidential nomination.
See G. EADS & M. Fix, RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA 140-46
(1984). The consequence of this strategy was that Congress failed to support regulatory reform
efforts requiring the granting of discretion in program heads. Id. at 146-48.
136. White House Report, Program for Economic Recovery, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 138, 151 (Feb. 18, 1981).
137. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 12 (1982). For competing perspectives on this executive order, compare Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of
Agency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981) (executive
order unconstitutionally subverts Congress' legislative primacy) with Demuth & Ginsberg, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986) (defending executive order). Interestingly, Congress threatened to cut off federal funding of OIRA due to the
overpoliticization of the review process. See Havermann, 'Defending' O.M.B. 's Rule Reviewers,
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ing, and able to tackle the Carter legacy of expansive race-conscious
programs and regulations.
Once in office, however, the Reagan Administration's pursuit of its
equal opportunity platform proved far from clear. This lack of clarity
evidences real limits in 'White House centralization efforts. Curiously,
one of the best demonstrations that the president is powerful but not
omnipotent is that Reagan civil rights policy came under attack from
both the left and the right. From the right, Jeremy Rabkin, pointing
to the administration's support of numerous affirmative action programs, accused the Reagan administration of "wring[ing] what[ever]
partisan advantage it can from the pattern of racial and ethnic spoils
established iri the 1970s." 138 Chester E. Finn, Jr., put the matter more
succinctly when he observed that "[t]he most ideological administration in recent history seems not to have its ideas sorted out"; instead
Reagan civil rights policy depended "more than it should on what day
it is, who is in charge of a particular decision, what constituency is
raising the loudest ruckus, and which agency is responsible for formulating the alternatives and executing the decision."139
Criticism did not come only from the right. Indeed, the Reagan
administration has been savaged by the left. Norman Amaker concludes that the Reagan civil rights record "reflects an energizing, consistent philosophical view . . . . That view is one that eschews any
attention to the historical roots of race and sex discrimination ... [but
focuses instead] on the present intent of alleged discriminatory conduct."140 Correlatively, during the Reagan years, the civil rights community issued numerous reports condemning the administration. The
liberal attacks targeted Reagan's opposition to voting rights reform
and the Civil Rights Restoration Act; Reagan's attempts to grant tax
breaks to discriminatory private schools and to reconstitute the Civil
Rights Commission in his own image; appointees to the Federal Communications Commission, Department of Education, and EEOC who
questioned the Carter legacy; and - most important - the granting
of carte blanche authority to the Department of Justice to launch a
frontal assault on numerical measures of equality.141
The Reagan administration's mixed record, while inviting criticism
Wash. Post, July 18, 1986, at A17, col. 1. After this threat, OIRA agreed to modify its review
procedures.
138. Rabkin, Reagan's Secret Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1985, at 15, 17. Specifically,
Rabkin pointed to Department of Labor enforcement of Executive Order 11,246, the Department of Education's use of numerical proofs of discrimination, the EEOC's demand that federal
agencies maintain affirmative action hiring plans, and minority business enterprise programs in
the Small Business Administration as well as the Department of Commerce.
139. Finn, supra note 133, at 28.
140. N. AMAKER, supra note 10, at 161.
141. See generally LEADERSHIP CoNFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITHOUT JUSTICE 75
(1982); WASHINGTON CoUNCIL OF LAWYERS, REAGAN CIVIL RIGHTS: THE FIRST TWENTY
MONTHS 5-6 (1982); Finn, supra note 133, at 17.
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from both sides, seems inevitable. First, federal civil rights enforcement sweeps throughout the executive branch; hence, effective White
House coordination is almost impossible. Unless a president makes
civil rights enforcement the benchmark of his administration, discontinuity seems unavoidable. Second, once a law is enacted and the initial
implementing regulations promulgated, it is extraordinarily difficult to
reconsider en masse the enforcement schemes of prior administrations.
Oversight committee and constituency interest opposition is simply
too formidable here. Consequently, secondary devices such as reorganization and policy prioritization - which do not directly attack
existing regulations - are often the best mechanism for change available to the White House. Third, reliance on such secondary devices
limits a president's civil rights legacy. Successor administrations can
easily reset priorities and reorganize agencies. The Reagan experience
supports each of these propositions and hence reveals the inherent limits of White House centralization. The balance of this section will consider these three matters in turn, portraying Graham's central
assertions about the difficulty of White House centralization, the import of early agency interpretations, and the power of other players courts, oversight committees, and interest groups - as truisms of the
modem presidency.
The Improbability of Centralization. Every government agency,
department, and commission is in the business of civil rights enforcement. Title VI requirements are enforced by all government agencies
distributing federal largess; 142 EEOC regulations call for sensitivity by
all government agencies to numerical equality objectives in their own
hiring. 143 Moreover, freestanding civil rights enforcement projects exist within the EEOC, SBA, FCC, Civil Rights Commission (CRC), the
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), and the Departments of Treasury,
Labor, Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Justice. 144 Given
the pervasiveness of civil rights enforcement, centralization can occur
only if the White House both makes coordination a primary objective
and is extremely diligent in appointing to key government posts individuals who agree with the president's views on civil rights enforcement. Otherwise, competing regulatory agenda items will take
precedence over civil rights enforcement and, correlatively, external
142. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1982).
143. "EEOC had cited § 717(B)(l) of Title VII and Executive Order 11,748 as requiring
Federal agency equal employment opportunity plans, including affirmative action goals, to be
reviewed and evaluated by EEOC." 1987 CR.C REPORT, supra note 6, at n. 313 (citing Clarence
Thomas, speech before NASA Equal Opportunity Council Meeting, Hampton, Va. 10-11 (May
26, 1983)).
144. With the exception of the Legal Service Corporation, these programs are discussed
throughout this review. For a discussion of Legal Services in the Reagan era, see Wallace, Out of
Control: Congress and the Legal Service Corporation, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY 169 (L.
Crowitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989).
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pressures from oversight committees and constituency interests will
dilute the White House agenda.
Reagan White House civil rights centralization efforts clearly suffered from internal and external coordination problems. Internal
problems derived from the existence of several competing strategies of
regulatory relief within the executive. The most visible strategy commonly associated with the Department of Justice in general and
Civil Rights Division head William Bradford Reynolds in particular
- was moralistic and rhetorically divisive. It viewed preferential
treatment "based on nothing more than personal characteristics of
race or gender ... as [just as] offensive to standards of human decency
today as it was some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v.
Ferguson ...." 145 It was also confrontational, calling for immediate
and massive judicial, regulatory, and legislative reform.146
The willingness of Justice to launch a frontal assault on numerical
proofs of discrimination and nonvictim relief is unique, however. The
preferred strategy of other civil rights enforcement agencies 147 EEOC, OFCC, and OCR - was to leave existing programs on the
books but to limit the effectiveness of those programs through a variety of enforcement strategies. Furthermore, agencies not principally
in the business of civil rights enforcement - even if sympathetic to the
Justice Department's moral imperative - focused their attentions on
other regulatory initiatives. Reagan FCC appointees, for example,
were willing to hold their opposition to minority race preferences in
check in order to advance their deregulatory agenda. Finally, at least
with respect to minority business enterprise programs housed in the
Small Business Administration as well as the Departments of Transportation and Commerce, the Reagan administration and its appointees favored some of the affirmative action initiatives launched by
Presidents Nixon and Carter.148
These varied strategies ensured a certain degree of disunity in Rea145. Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, 1981:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 131, 137 (1981) (citation omitted) (statement of William
Bradford Reynolds); see also Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown,
93 YALE L.J. 995, 998-1001 (1984) (individual rights best protected through race-neutral
means).
146. This vision shares common ground with ideological attacks on social regulation
launched at the Equal Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 135, at
256-57. Specifically, appointees were chosen for ideological opposition to the Carter administra·
lion's regulatory agenda, not substantive expertise with the programs they were to administer;
appointees viewed the agency's permanent career professionals as the enemy; and appointees
were willing to place commitment to an ideological vision ahead of marginal change premised
upon the propriety of scaling down current programs. Id. at 142-43.
147. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
148. See Pear, Administration Challenges Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986,
at Al, col. 2.
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gan civil rights policies. Ironically, this disunity can be explained, in
part, by efforts towards White House centralization. Most significant,
"movement conservatives" at Justice and the White House saw themselves in the midst of a holy war that required uniform adherence to
the Justice creed. 149 As caricatured by former Education Secretary
T.H. Bell, these "extremists" would say: "Let the chaos come ....
This is part of the revolution! Pragmatism is cowardice and weakness!"150 In the end, however, this absolutist approach undermined
any chance of effective White House centralization.
The keys to this failure are three extraordinary policy blunders
made by the President at the urging of the Department of Justice.
First, Reagan's ostensible commitment to simple nondiscrimination
was called into question when his administration sought in 1982 to
restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private
schools. 151 Second, in the midst of this fiasco, Reagan announced his
opposition to provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments
which make disparate racial impact an important evidentiary tool in
voting rights cases. 152 In explaining the administration's position, a
"hearing room full of civil-rights activists erupted into laughter" when
Attorney General Smith remarked that "the President doesn't have a
discriminatory bone in his body." 153 Third, in 1983, President Reagan
(unsuccessfully) sought to remove Mary Frances Berry and two of her
colleagues from the allegedly "independent, bipartisan" U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 154 In their stead, Reagan advanced three nominees who, according to Reagan, "don't worship at the altar of forced
busing and mandatory quotas" and "don't believe you can remedy
past discrimination by mandating new discrimination."1 55 Although
he had good reason to be fed up with the Commission's partisan attacks on his administration, 156 Reagan's efforts here, as Senator Edward Kennedy put it, appeared to be "an unprecedented assault on the
independence and integrity of the Civil Rights Commission."1 57
The costs of these three blunders to White House centralization
149. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
150. Bell, Education Policy Development in the Reagan Administration, PHI DELTA KAPPAN,
Mar. 1986, at 487, 491 [hereinafter Bell, Education Policy]; see also T. BELL, THE THIRTEENTH
MAN 99-113 (1988).
151. I.R.S. News Release, Jan. 8, 1982.
152. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982).
153. Finn, supra note 133, at 27.
154. See President Fires Three Members of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at A-1 (Oct. 25, 1983). See generally Nomination Hearings, supra note 12.
155. See Weisman, Reagan Defends 3 Nominations to Rights Panel, N.Y. Times News Serv.,
Aug. 1, 1983, reprinted in Nomination Hearings, supra note 12, at 501.
156. See Letter from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to the Vice President, 1 (Feb. 12,
1982) ("The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights views with increasing alarm efforts to end Federal
leadership in promoting equal educational opportunity."); Finn, supra note 133, at 24-25.
157. Nomination Hearings, supra note 12, at 219 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
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were enormous. Pragmatists within the administration thought it politically unwise for the White House itself to expend further political
capital in this area. Furthermore, Reagan appointees at other agencies
witnessed and learned from these events that confrontational politics
comes at a high cost. Consequently, although kamikaze pilots at the
Department of Justice were allowed to continue their mission, neither
the White House nor other agencies would assist them in it. 158
External pressures, principally in the form of legislative oversight,
also stood in the way of White House centralization. The EEOC's
experience was typical. Despite stated objections to both affirmative
action remedies and the 1978 Uniform Guidelines, 159 the EEOC never
formally modified preexisting Carter EEOC regulations. Repeated
oversight hearings, 160 Government Accounting Office investigations
(and threats thereof), 161 committee reports, l62 confirmation hearings, 163 and the power of the purse all moderated the agency's behavior.164 For example, EEOC chair Clarence Thomas explicitly
158. This apparent discord is best explained by Reagan's noninterventionist approach to
managing department heads. See Bell, Education Policy, supra note 150, at 490. Ironically, Justice's efforts to impose its imprimatur on Reagan civil rights enforcement undermined a more
modest and potentially successful approach. Recurring enforcement strategies of the Reagan
administration generally eschewed repudiation of existing programs in favor of, as George Eads
and Michael Fix observed, "adoption of a new and more exclusive screening criteria for identifying potential violators; unwillingness to test new legal or economic theories that might expand
the existing classes of violators; [and) reduced discretion for field enforcement personnel ••.• "
G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 135, at 193-94. This more modest approach would have been less
subject to political attack and, consequently, might have withstood oversight committee and
constituency group pressure.
159. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Policies Regarding Goals and Timeta-

bles in Litigation Remedies: Hearjngs Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986) (statement of Clarence
Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) ("[N]umerically based remedies which focus on sex, race or ethnic considerations have the potential to undermine the ultimate goals of nondiscrimination embodied in Title VII."); see also Hearings, supra note 7, at 354
(statement of C. Thomas).
160. During the Reagan years, Congress held many oversight hearings each year. See generally 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-44. Moreover, there were numerous informal contacts between the oversight committees and the EEOC.
161. See GAO, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES (1981); GAO, INQUIRY INTO ALLEGED OPERATING AND MAN·
AGEMENT PROBLEMS IN EEOC's OFFICE OF REVIEW AND APPEALS (1982); Letter from Rep.
Augustus Hawkins to Comptroller General Charles Bowsher (July 15, 1985) (requesting GAO
investigation).
162. See. e.g., REPORT, supra note 7.
163. See, e.g., Nomination of Clarence Thomas, of Missouri, to be Chairman of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings]; Nomination of Jeffrey Ira
Zuckerman. of Virginia, to be General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1986).
164. Congress' power of the purse is best revealed in the EEOC's annual budget submission
and the corresponding oversight hearings which accompany that submission. See generally 1987
CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 9-44.
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endorsed the use of goals and timetables, despite his personal objections, at Senate reconfirmation hearings. 165 Indeed, on several occasions, the EEOC locked horns with the Department of Justice on the
numerical equality issue. 166 Moreover, despite the White House's suggestion that the 1978 guidelines were inefficient, the EEOC left the
guidelines alone, 167 apparently because the political costs of revision
were too high. 168
The failure of the Reagan White House to centralize civil rights
enforcement is not surprising. Despite Reagan's alleged ideological vision and his attempts to centralize government regulation, 169 numerous internal and external pressures undermined a coordinated civil
rights enforcemerit strategy. Some of these pressures are endemic to
all administrations. For example, the inevitably divergent interests of
government agencies and departments had previously doomed Johnson (pp. 44, 64), Kennedy (pp. 181-84, 192), and Carter170 administration efforts at interagency coordination. However, some of the
problems the Reagan administration faced were unique unto it. An
overly ideological group of "movement conservatives," Reagan's reliance on delegating authority to like-minded individuals to accomplish
centralization objectives, 171 and the simple fact that the Reagan administration was swimming against the political current172 were cir165. See Thomas Hearings, supra note 163, at 44.
166. These disputes concerned Justice's representation of the EEOC before the Supreme
Court, intervention in lower federal court cases in which the EEOC was a party, and refusal to
comply with EEOC affirmative action guidelines for federal agencies and departments. See 1987
CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 4042; see also Letter from Clarence Thomas to Attorney General
Smith reprinted in Hearing before Subcommittee on Constitutional and Civil Rights, House Judiciary Committee, May 6, 1983.
167. See Barringer, Job Bias Debate is Reopened, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1981, at A27, col. 2;
1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
168. OIRA's influence was more profound in deterring the EEOC from adopting expansive
age discrimination regulations. After the EEOC in 1984 decided to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to apprenticeship training programs, OIRA returned the rule to the
agency "expressing concern that prohibiting apprenticeship programs [from] imposing age limits
might prevent employers from recovering the cost of training." Selected Statements Delivered
January 28, 1988 to the House Select Committee on Aging, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 19, at El (Jan. 28, 1988) (testimony of Clarence Thomas). In 1987, the EEOC formally concurred with
OIRA on this matter. See id.
169. See generally 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 4042, 61, 71, 93-4, 100.
170. See U.S. CoMMN. ON Ctv. RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CtvlL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT- 1977, To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: A SEQUEL 331 (1977) (federal
agencies disagreed with each other "as to the meaning of discrimination and how discrimination,
once identified, should be remedied."); J. CALIFANO, supra note 31, at 240-41 (describing conflicts within Carter administration strategy in Bakke litigation); L. FISHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES 27 n.68 (1988) (describing conflicts between White House and Department of Justice); Kneeland, Sears Sues U.S. over Job Bias Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 1
(Sears charged the federal government with promulgating conflicting requirements in federal
employment law.).
171. But see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
172. Indeed, even business - presumably saddled with the burdens of affirmative action opposed Reagan initiatives here. Cf. H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 196-200; Seligman, Affirmative
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cumstances peculiar to the Reagan administration.
That the Reagan administration did not speak with one voice highlights the difficulty of coordinating civil rights policy in the modem
administrative state. That difficulty, however, contrary to Graham's
suggestion, does not mean that the White House is without substantial
power in this area.
Administrative Discretion to Alter Regulatory Policymaking. The
Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about the limits of
agency power to modify existing regulatory structures. Direct repeal
of existing interpretations and regulations is unlikely to succeed. Indirect attacks launched through agency reorganization and policy prioritization are far more likely to succeed.
Enforcement agencies seeking to repeal existing programs are
likely to confront a potent legislative attack. FCC efforts to rescind
the granting of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by
the enactment of single-year funding restrictions forbidding such reconsideration.173 This direct challenge to existing rulemaking, combined with the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, "so poisoned
relations between the two entities that it stimulated congressional
oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is unprecedented. "174 Congress has used its power of the purse in other ways to
correct agencies which disregard their past and, with it, legislative
preferences. Such was the fate suffered by the Reagan appointee
driven U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Unwilling to play ball with
Congress, the Commission - in addition to being subjected to an extensive GAO audit 175 - had its appropriations severely reduced and
was directed by Congress to pursue specified research priorities and to
allocate its appropriations internally according to a restrictive legislative formula. 176 Finally, Congress used its confirmation power to punAction is Here to Stay, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 1982, at 143, 162. The primary cost of swimming
against the political current, however, is the cost of doing battle with civil rights interest groups.
For those who oppose numerical proofs of discrimination and affirmative action programs, the
power of civil rights is analogous to powerful special interests throughout government. The
difference in civil rights is that, unlike farm supports, trade tariffs, etc., policymaking implicates
fundamental moral and economic concerns. This is a difference that matters. At the same time,
the focus of concern should not be the efforts of special interests (for democratic free market
politics dictates that special interests will advance their claims); instead, the focus should be on
the ability of elected government to distinguish civil rights concerns from other types of
concerns.
173. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101-Stat. 1329, 1329-31-32; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17; Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 1020.
174. Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56.
175. See Brock, Politicizing the Government's Watchdog, Wall St. J., July 16, 1986, § 1, at 22,
col. 3.
176. See Kurtz, Hill Slashes Funding far Rights Panel, Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1986, at A12,
col. 4. See generally Comment, supra note 12, 492-95 (1987).
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ish individuals within the administration who spearheaded
confrontational operations. William Bradford Reynolds' appointment
to the Associate Attorney General position at the Department of Justice was turned down, 177 as were the nominations of Jeffrey Zuckerman (to EEOC general counsel) 178 and John Agresto (to Archivist). 179
Interestingly, each of these exercises of congressional power was indirect. Congress never enacted substantive legislative amendments to
correct administrative exegesis; rather, it relied on temporal measures
such as single-year appropriations and the confirmation of single administration appointments.
Enforcement agencies fare much better when the chosen weapons
for change are reorganization, policy prioritization, and the simplification of existing regulations. These changes neither require congressional support nor do they force an agency to call attention to changes
in existing policy.
The ostensible purposes of agency reorganizations are to "maximize efficiency and economy, promote effective planning and coordination, reduce program fragmentation and overlap, eliminate
unnecessary paperwork, and increase accountability." 180 During the
Reagan years, however, reorganizations also enabled political appointees to maintain greater control over their operations. For example,
the EEOC created an Office of Legal Counsel charged with interagency coordination and the drafting of regulations. 181 The Civil
Rights Commission also traveled this road by creating an Office of
Program and Policy Review to play the lead role in the drafting of
Commission reports. Since political appointees fill these new offices
with a cadre of trustworthy individuals, these offices - especially at
the Civil Rights Commission - were used as workhorses of the new
regime.1s2
Policy prioritization enables agencies to displace problematic programs in favor of preferred programs. The EEOC proved the agency
most adept at policy prioritization during the Reagan years. In Sep177. See Dickinson, Running Scared in Pennsylvania: Sen. Specter Aims to Survive in Democratic Te"itory, Wash. Post, July 6, 1985, at A4, col. l; Kurtz, Reynolds' Nomination Voted
Down, Wash. Post, June 28, 1985, at Al, col. 2; Dulce, Senate Panel Rejects Reagan Nominee for
Associate Attorney General Post, Wall St. J., June 28, 1985, § l, at 3, col. 2.
178. Thornton, Senate Rejects EEOC Nomination.· Comments on Discrimination Were Issue,
Wash. Post, May 21, 1986, at A23.
179. Werner, Senate Panel Derails Nomination/or Archives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at D16, col. 4.
180. G. EADS & M. Fix, supra note 135, at 156.
181. See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 18-19.
182. Correlatively, when budget cuts forced the dismissal of agency employees, the ax disproportionately fell on "old line" pre-Reagan staffers. See, e.g., LEADERSHIP CoNFERENCE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON THE CLOSING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS CoMMISSION'S REGIONAL
OFFICES (1986) (news release on file with Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review),
cited in Comment, supra note 12, at 494 n.258.
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tember 1984, the agency announced it would place greater emphasis
on litigation to secure redress for identified victims of employment discrimination.183 The agency's emphasis on individual make-whole relief meant that fewer resources were available to pursue class action
cases - whose remedies often included goals, timetables, and quotas.184 Yet pursuit of this individualized approach left existing regulations and directives used in class action litigation unaffected. 18S
Furthermore, class action litigation was not eliminated, just reduced
(from sixty-seven percent, in fiscal year 1980, to thirty-five percent, in
fiscal year 1986, of all nonsubpoena cases). 186 Consequently, while
members of Congress disapproved of this approach, 187 the EEO C's
shift from one legitimate policy objective to another did not raise legislative ire to the retaliation point.
The EEOC also proved adept at policymaking through inaction,
that is, through refusing to adopt reform initiatives. During the Reagan years, for example, the agency rejected comparable worth as a
mechanism of determining job discrimination under Title VII, 188 declined to extend Title VII to professional certification and licensing, 189
and refused to adopt regulations extending the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to apprenticeship programs. 190 These refusals did
not alter the status quo ante and hence were not readily subject to
legislative attack.
Policymaking through the simplification of existing procedures is
yet another device that enables agencies to attack regulatory excesses
without challenging the bottom line. Take the case of the Reagan
OFCC. 191 Although not challenging the Executive Order program,
the OFCC modified the program through internal directives, orders,
183. EEOC Commissioners' Memorandum, Statement of Enforcement Policy, Sept. 11, 1984
reprinted in REPORT, supra note 7, at 104-07.
184. Williams, A Question of Fairness. ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 70, 80.
185. See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
186. See id. at 38. One explanation for declining class action filings is that employers, after
years of experience with Title VII demands, are less likely to commit class wrongs over time.
Yet, in stark contrast to this "simple economics" argument, the Carter EEOC sought to shift
resources from individual cases to "the equally vital task of identifying and attacking employment systems that illegally operated to exclude whole classes of people from jobs or promotions."
Leach, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the EEOC: An Agency in the Midst of Change, 29
MERCER L. REV. 661, 669 (1978).
187. See Letter from Rep. Augustus Hawkins, supra note 161.
188. EEOC Decision No. 85-80 (1985 EEOC Lexis 19) (June 17, 1985; reissued with corrections July 12, 1985) (comparable worth decision). By contrast, the Carter administration seemed
ready to endorse comparable worth. In 1979, Carter EEOC chair Eleanor Holmes Norton depicted comparable worth as the most imP9rtant issue of the 1980s. See Krucoff, Money: The
Question of Men, Women and "Comparable Worth," Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1979, at BS, col. 1.
189. EEOC Decision No. 87-2, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) ~ 6869 (Aug.
31, 1987).
190. See supra note 168.
191. See text accompanying notes 60-61.
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and notices. 192 OFCC, moreover, told its regional managers "not to
require or to accept affirmative action plans with goals exceeding
availability unless there were identifiable victims of discrimination...." 193 Ironically, the OFCC ultimately reverted to much of its
Carter era enforcement strategy as a result of congressional pressures
fueled by the failed efforts of William Bradford Reynolds and others to
have President Reagan rescind Executive Order 11,246. 194
The Reagan years then tell a cautionary tale about executive
power. Implementation strategies with modest objectives can move
agency policymaking in the direction of administration priorities.
However, once constituency and congressional expectations are well
settled, efforts to replace existing approaches with a new regime will
meet tremendous resistance. Since Congress holds the ultimate trump
card with, among other things, its power of the purse, direct attacks
such as those launched by the FCC and Civil Rights Commission
seem doomed to failure. Consequently, after the enactment of legislation and promulgation of initial agency regulations and interpretation,
executive power lies principally at the margins. As such, White House
centralization efforts cannot rewrite the nation's civil rights agenda.
Furthermore, only a jerry-rigged structure can be assembled with the
tools of executive power - appointments, reorganization, policy prioritization - and hence it is unlikely for a president to establish a civil
rights legacy.
Reagan's Legacy. Aside from judicial appointments, Reagan's attempts at centralizing civil rights enforcement will likely have little
lasting effect. The Reagan administration spent some significant political capital in opposing voting rights legislation, vetoing the Civil
Rights Restoration Act, supporting tax breaks for discriminatory private schools, and enabling the Justice Department to launch a frontal
assault on preferential hiring. In paying the bill for these unpopular
policies, moreover, the Reagan administration received very little in
return. Internal discord and external pressures ultimately left the
Reagan civil rights agenda in disrepair. The Reagan experience then
cautions against serious White House centralization efforts that vary
significantly from constituency and legislative expectations.
192. See H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 194; see also 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 82-83.
193. Id. at 82 (referring to OFCCP Memorandum for Area Office Directors). OFCC also
eased pressure on national corporations by permitting the adoption of standardized affirmative
action plans. See H. BELZ, supra note 48, at 194.
194. See, e.g., Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of Labor Meisinger on OFCCP Enforcement Before House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, reprinted in Daily Lab.
Report (BNA), at E-1(June5, 1987); see also Letter from Larry Rogers to Susan Prado (July 7,
1987), reprinted in 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 135. The "liberalization" of the OFCCP
can be attributed, in part, to congressional pressure. See, e.g., Statements Before the House
Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities at Oversight Hearing on Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at F-1 (June 4, 1987) (statement of
Rep. Augustus Hawkins).
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George Bush's strategy is proof positive of this lesson. Rather than
follow "in the tradition of Ronald Reagan," as the 1988 Republican
platform puts it, 195 the Bush administration is clearly unwilling to stay
the course in civil rights. Critical appointments at the Department of
Education, Federal Communications Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and Civil Rights Commission suggest
dramatic differences between Bush's approach to civil rights and Reagan's.196 Moreover, although he vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
Bush's support of the Americans with Disabilities Act and minority
scholarship programs further highlights differences between the two
administrations.
The Reagan experience offers a telling supplement to The Civil
Rights Era. With legislat~ve programs in place and hence little opportunity to exert the type of raw power available during an agency's nascent development, White House policymaking operates within a
culture of settled expectations. Consequently, the White House must
face the external pressures of oversight committees and constituency
interests. Centralization, moreover, is complicated by the internal
pressures associated with the extraordinary sweep of modern civil
rights enforcement. During the Reagan years, competing policy agendas from within the administration seriously curtailed centralization
efforts. Yet, contrary to Graham's assertions, the problem of centralization was not one of bureaucrats run amok. Career bureaucrats did
not derail the Reagan administration, for White House appointees
generally seemed unsympathetic to the careerist's perspective. 197 Instead, the lesson of "full policy cycle" implementation is that internal
and external pressures limit the scope of White House centralization.
For example, marginal administrative adjustments such as reorganization, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification appear
more successful than direct conflict. In fact, policy blunders associated with the confrontational approach cost the administration dearly.
The Bush administration, for example, responded to these Reagan initiatives by distancing itself so much from its Republican predecessor
that Reagan's civil rights legacy amounts to very little indeed. In the
end, the Reagan administration would have been better served by marginal administrative adjustments such as reorganization, resource prioritization, and regulatory simplification than direct conflict.
The Reagan years, however, do not speak to the futility of White
House centralization. Iron triangles, contrary to Graham's depiction,
195. 1988 Republican Party Platform reprinted in CONG. Q. 2369, 2399 (Aug. 20, 1988).
196. See Devins, The Civil Rights Commission's Backslide, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1990, § 1, at
14, col. 4. Contrary to tbe title of my opinion piece (written by editorial page writers with a
point of view of tbeir own), I do not necessarily perceive that differences between the Bush and
Reagan administrations represent changes for tbe worse.
197. See Deregulation HQ, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1981, at 22-23 (interview of Murray L.
Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III by Antonin Scalia and Anne Brunsdale, editors).
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are impediments, not obstructions. The success of the Reagan EEOC
is testament to this. Yet, when the political context dictates, the
White House must be willing to play the game of subtle bureaucratic
maneuvering, and this game promises only a modest payoff. Hence it
is in accord with Graham's central contention about the limits of
White House power.
IV.

CONCLUSION: ALL

Is

WELL IN MUDVILLE

Proponents of a strong executive are likely to find disheartening
the combined lessons of The Civil Rights Era and the Reagan experience. Agencies appear inherently resistant to administration directives; legislative and interest group pressures exacerbate these
difficulties; and court opinions appear a disruptive wild card. Furthermore, secondary policymaking devices that work within existing regulatory regimes often serve as the principal mechanism for executive
influence. Interestingly, proponents of an imperial Congress, too, are
likely to be disturbed by both Graham's account and the Reagan
years. The White House appears coequal in the enactment of legislation, 198 and agencies (frequently controlled by the executive) play the
lead role in both the interpretation and implementation of legislation.
Indeed, Congress must resort to a host of oversight techniques ranging from hearings to explicit budgetary constraints - to protect
its lawmaking role. Weakness in executive and legislative power, however, does not mean that agencies reign supreme. Presidential power
to appoint, submit budgets, approve reorganizations, and monitor
rulemaking severely limit agency power. Congress' oversight techniques as well as its ability to modify substantive law also undermine
agency control. Furthermore, legislative and executive priorities may
be at odds, thus making it impossible for an agency to please both
198. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is proof positive of the president's instrumental role in the
shaping of legislation. When proposed, the Act, among other things, demanded that an em·
ployer demonstrate that her employment practices are "essential to effective job performance"
whenever a group of employment practices "results in a disparate impact ...." S. 2104, lOlst
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. 81019 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (emphasis added). After President
Bush threatened to veto the measure, bill sponsors made significant concessions. Under the compromise measure, the complaining party, where practicable, had to identify "which specific [employment] practice or practices contributed to the disparate impact •.•." H.R. Rep. No. 755,
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) (Conference Report) (emphasis added). Moreover, to defend selection practices, the employer need only show that "the practice or group of practices ... bear a
significant relationship to successful performance of the job" to sustain her burden of proof. Id.
at 2. Despite these compromise efforts, President Bush vetoed the bill, and the veto was sustained. See Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights Bill Veto, Dooming Measure for 1990, Wash.
Post, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al5, col. 1. The success of the Bush veto suggests that the president, not
congressional sponsors, may well be in the driver's seat in defining the terms of this debate. See
Kenworthy and Lee, Civil Rlghts Compromise is Readied; House Democrats' Proposal Includes
Controverslal Cap, Wash. Post, May 17, 1991, at Al. This conclusion is bolstered by the House
of Representative's June 5, 1991, failure to approve the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by a veto·proof
majority. See Kenworthy, House Approves CM/ Rlghts Bill,· 273-158 Vote Would Not Override
Veto, Wash. Post, June 6, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
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constituencies. Consequently, contrary to Graham's assertions, bureaucracies do not reign supreme.199
The end result is that the power to make and implement the law is
diffuse rather than centralized in one branch of government or another. Moreover, as Terry Mcie recognizes, "[t]he [increasing] layering of presidential bureaucracy upon congressional bureaucracy . . .
will likely become a still more consequential - and organizationally
disruptive - feature of American government .... " 200 This state of
affairs, however, is precisely how modern government should work the legislative and the executive branches are neither supreme nor
without power; agencies serve as conciliators responding to competing
executive and legislative pressures.
The enactment and enforcement of civil rights laws then provides a
model of the workings of modern government. While bemoaning the
ultimate impotency of executive power, Hugh Davis Graham's The
Civil Rights Era reveals that the executive possesses great power (if not
control) - especially in the law enactment phase. The Reagan experience likewise reveals that the executive can play an important - albeit
transitory - role in the implementation of the law. While the Reagan
White House may have poorly managed its power delegation, the administration's failure here is largely the failure of politics and not the
failure of the presidency.
199. The judiciary, while an important player, is more a wild card than a lead actor and,
hence, I think it would be inappropriate to speak of judicial supremacy in the same way that I
refer to legislative, executive, and administration supremacy. Granted, in some instances, disappointed constituent interests advance their policy objectives through the courts. See generally
J. RABKIN, supra note 92. Indeed, on occasion, the courts - through the enforcement of injunc·
tive relief - effectively transform government agencies into agencies of constituent interests. See
id. at 147-81 (discussing "capture" of OCR through Adams lawsuit). Yet, these occurrences are
rare and likely not to occur in the future. See Williams, Fingers in the Pie (Book Review), 68
TExAs L. REv. 1303 (1990) (reviewing J. Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions). Instead, it is far more
likely that courts will defer to agency statutory interpretations and hence defeat these interest
group efforts. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (agency interpretations are entitled to great deference, including the filling in of gaps left
by Congress); cf. J. RABKIN supra note 92, at 81 (noting that the Supreme Court's Chevron ruling
"took it for granted that judges must hold executive operatives to those standards which they can
discern as being intended by the enacting Congress"). At this level, the judiciary will function
much as it did in The Civil Rights Era, that is, enabling the EEOC and other agencies to control
the meaning oflegislation. Indeed, since legislative delegations are often broad, agency interpretations - as Graham suggests - serve as an important policymaking tool. This is the lesson of
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), a recent Supreme Court decision approving the Reagan
administration's policy-driven interpretation of a 1970 family planning statute to forbid federally
funded family planning centers from mentioning abortion. See also Bryner, Congress, Courts,
and Agencies: Equal Employment and the Limits of Policy Implementation, 96 POL. Sci. Q. 411
(1981).
200. Moe, The Politics ofBureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN 267,
328 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1989). Moe further recognizes that "compromise" and "uncertainty" in American government makes both winning and losing groups impose "protective
structures they know are impediments to effective performance." Id. at 327. Finally, "because
presidents are constitutionally empowered and politically induced to control executive agencies,
they cannot be stopped from acting to impose structures of their own that may be quite incompatible with those prescribed by Congress." Id.
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The Civil Rights Era, despite its many strengths, could benefit from
a tighter, more analytically focused presentation. The book is too
much like a travelogue and too little like a proof. Too much responsibility is placed on the reader to tie together Graham's assertions of
agency power, White House centralization, and the rise of group
rights. Graham's argument also would benefit from both a fuller
treatment of existing topics (EEOC testing, early agency support of
numerical proofs) and the inclusion of other relevant topics (race and
education, minority business enterprise). Graham also goes too far in
using the "imperial presidency" as his normative benchmark. That
there is room for improvement, however, does not mean that the book
does not succeed admirably.. It does, but there is clearly room
, improvement.
·
The Civil Rights Era (and the Reagan experience) reveals the limits of White House centralization in civil rights. Graham's interpretation of these limitations as reflective of a tragic weakening of the
presidency is subject to debate. In my view, limits on White House
centralization are a necessary feature of the administrative state.
While I disagree with Graham on this matter, I am mightily glad to
have been able to base my judgment on a reading of The Civil Rights
Era's lucid chronicling of the 1960-1972 period.

